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ABSTRACT: This report provides a framework and some of the basic data necessary to 
understand why the future of the United States will not be determined solely by anticipated 
changes in the size and age distribution of the population. Choices made through the 
political process and through market forces, in conjunction with demographic changes, will 
determine the future, the authors say. The critical challenge of an aging society is not so 
much how to accommodate the older population, but how to ensure the productivity of 
future workers, regardless of age. Public policies that encourage and facilitate education, 
basic research, and the application of promising technologies can enhance the well-being of 
current and future generations of older people. Greater economic growth can make policy 
choices easier, but deciding how much of the proceeds of economic growth to use 
collectively and how to distribute costs and benefits will require political and policy choices. 
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PREFACE 
 
Authors’ Note: In this report, unless otherwise noted, the term “older people” 
generally refers to individuals age 65 and older. This reflects the manner in which 
data are often reported. 
 
For most of recorded history, average life expectancy at birth was less than 30 
years. By 1900, average life expectancy in the United States had reached nearly age 50, 
and by 2000 it had reached age 74 for men and age 80 for women. These vast 
improvements can be traced to a wide array of nutritional and environmental factors as 
well as advances in medicine. Recent advances in medical care, particularly surrounding 
the detection and treatment of heart disease, have led to marked increases in life 
expectancy at age 65 and older. 
 
The improvement in life expectancy is a benefit of the dramatic increase in the 
wealth of developed nations, and a contributor to that increase. In those nations, 
“retirement” has been established as a normative stage of life. The definition of retirement 
continues to evolve, but its presence is part of a social revolution.1 All of us are a part of 
this transformation. The choices we make throughout our lives are a part of this process. 
Our choices are guided by expectations, labor market conditions, circumstantial 
opportunities, our health, the health of our families, and the availability and structure of 
public programs and private institutions. The evolution and ongoing transformation of 
retirement has changed our culture and contributed to the changes in the demographic 
structure of society. 
 
Society’s future is not determined solely by demographic changes. Focusing on the 
anticipated growth in population by age group is just too simplistic an approach. Rather, 
the future is shaped by the choices made—or not made—individually and collectively, 
bounded by the limits in resources and, in particular, knowledge. Knowledge is at the 
heart of gains in productivity, economic growth, and the advances in medical care, 
agriculture, communication, transportation, and the environment. 
 
Population change must be considered in the context of other changes throughout 
the economy and society. Private markets and public policies are not only effective tools 
for encouraging individual behavior, but also for responding to the collective needs of 
consumers, workers, and employers. 
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This report begins with an examination of demographic changes that have 
occurred and those that are most likely to occur in the near future. A discussion of the 
importance of the economy follows. Although economic growth has contributed to 
demographic change, it is quite likely that demographic changes have also affected 
economic growth. In Part II, the capacity of people and institutions to adapt is explored. 
Data make clear that today’s older people are different from their predecessors. In the 
future, the needs of older people and their contributions to society are likely to be 
different as well. This report concludes with a discussion of policy options that can 
influence the future and summarizes the primary policy challenges of an aging society. 
 
This report builds on Demography Is Not Destiny, which was published in January 
1999. That report was directed by a distinguished group of scholars who met regularly to 
discuss the implications of an aging society. The working group, which was chaired by 
Judith Feder, Georgetown University, and Marilyn Moon, American Institutes of 
Research, also included James C. Callahan, Jr., Brandeis University; Susan Dentzer, The 
NewsHour with Jim Lehrer; Jack Hadley, Urban Institute; Roger C. Herdman, Institute 
of Medicine; James S. Jackson, University of Michigan; Jerry L. Mashaw, Yale University; 
Sandra Newman, Johns Hopkins University; Joseph F. Quinn, Boston College; and 
Timothy M. Smeeding, Syracuse University. The work that was undertaken to produce 
Demography Is Not Destiny was supported by the Commonwealth Fund. 
 
The overwhelming response to that first effort led us to prepare Demography Is Not 
Destiny, Revisited. Our intent was not simply to update the data, but to reexamine the 
points made six years ago with the advantage of more years of data and the commentary 
collected from the first version. The opportunity granted us by the Commonwealth Fund 
produced substantial rewriting and the replacement of many charts. We were most 
fortunate that Judith Feder, Marilyn Moon, Jerry Mashaw, Joseph Quinn, and Timothy 
Smeeding, who were instrumental in shaping the first report, were willing to work with 
us to comment on drafts of this report. Their comments proved invaluable in helping us 
to sort out the interdependence of the many factors that will make tomorrow different 
from today. We are also grateful for the comments and insights of Barbara Cooper of the 
Commonwealth Fund, as well as the comments on earlier drafts from others at the Fund. 
 
As this report is being written, the United States is engaged in a war on terrorist 
organizations, state governments have been making gut-wrenching cuts due to budget 
deficits, the size of the federal budget deficit has increased dramatically, and U.S. troops 
are engaged in very dangerous missions in Iraq. Despite this, our optimism about the 
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future has not been dampened. People have always shown tremendous capacity to adapt 
to economic fluctuations, political unrest, and national emergencies. While the transitional 
costs of events like these are not distributed fairly, individuals continue to demonstrate an 
incredible capacity to give of themselves for causes greater than themselves. This 
selflessness, in conjunction with selfish entrepreneurial zeal, reflects a complex public 
spirit. We fiercely compete in the marketplace and yet we are genuinely interested in 
joining together, as families and communities, to take on collective challenges. No doubt, 
the aging of society will continue to impose tremendous challenges, but through collective 
actions in the political process as well as collective actions in the marketplace, these 
challenges can be met without necessarily diminishing future standards of living. 
 
  
1
INTRODUCTION 
That our society is aging is well known. Media stories and political rhetoric abound 
concerning the impending demographic challenges as the population age 65 and older is 
anticipated to more than double by the year 2030. Much of the handwringing concerns an 
expectation of dire fiscal consequences for publicly financed programs, such as Medicare 
and Social Security, of which older people tend to be the principal beneficiaries. 
 
What is not said is that planning for the future on the basis of demographic 
projections alone is a fool’s game. Population projections can be wrong, but even if they 
turn out to be correct, other factors, particularly those related to the economy and public 
policies, can have a decidedly greater impact on the future than simply the growing 
number and proportion of older people. What is needed for wise policy planning is a close 
look at the range of influences on our future and the willingness to make choices to use 
some of our wealth to invest in the future. 
 
No doubt the future will be different from the past. Yet we can take solace by 
looking to the past. After all, some of the anticipated demographic changes, like the 
doubling of the population age 65 and older, have already occurred. The population is 
anticipated to grow older than it is now, but the population is already older now than it 
has ever been. Moreover, demographically the United States is considerably younger than 
most other industrialized countries. What can we learn by looking to the past and 
understanding how the economy and public policies interacted with demographic 
changes? And what can we learn by looking at older nations as well? 
 
This report provides a framework and some of the basic data necessary to 
understand why our future is not determined solely by the anticipated changes in the size 
and age distribution of the population. Themes repeated throughout this report include: 
 
• Demography is not destiny. The choices made through the political process and 
through market forces, in conjunction with demographic changes, will determine 
the future. 
• The critical challenge of an aging society is not so much how to accommodate the 
older population, but how to ensure the productivity of future workers, regardless 
of age. 
• In the future, older persons are likely to be at least as diverse in terms of their 
health, financial status, and ethnic origins as their predecessors. Not all racial and 
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ethnic populations have benefited from past economic growth to the same extent. 
Some groups are extremely vulnerable. 
• Uncovered health and long-term care expenses leave everyone fiscally vulnerable, 
but particularly affect older persons. 
• Public policies that encourage and facilitate education, basic research, and the 
application of promising technologies can enhance the well-being of current and 
future generations of older people. 
• Greater economic growth can make policy choices easier, but deciding how much 
of the proceeds of economic growth to use collectively and how to distribute costs 
and benefits will require political and policy choices. 
 
The U.S. Population Age 65 and Older Has Already Grown 
Dramatically Without Devastating Consequences 
Future demographic change is much easier to anticipate than other forms of change. At 
any point in the past century, one could have easily anticipated a dramatic increase in the 
size and proportion of the population age 65 and older. Since 1900, the number of 
Americans age 65 and older has doubled three times. Since 1960, the population age 65 
and older has doubled while the overall population has only grown 57 percent. However, 
since 1960 the nation’s income (as measured by real gross domestic product) has nearly 
quadrupled. 
 
Economic Growth Matters 
Economic growth has made the nation more prosperous and has enabled many to enjoy a 
higher standard of living than would have been possible a generation earlier. Although 
income and wealth are not distributed equally, most families have seen their material 
standard of living improve with each generation. 
 
Many wonder if the country can support an aging society. Most of this anxiety is 
directed at one aspect of aging: federal entitlement spending. In 1998, the Commission on 
Retirement Policy predicted “rapid increases in entitlement spending…spiraling 
deficits…huge revenue needs…a burden on future generations.”2 In 1995, the Bipartisan 
Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform warned that “… the projected imbalance 
between spending and revenues—particularly with regard to health care and retirement 
entitlement programs—will, together with interest on the federal debt, undermine 
America’s capacity to make appropriate investments in the well being of our citizens and 
undertake other essential government functions, such as national defense.”3 
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There are legitimate reasons to be concerned about growth in expenditures, but 
there is more reason to be concerned about economic growth. With little economic 
growth society faces fewer choices on how to care for those who are least able to care for 
themselves. With sufficient economic growth there are more choices and fewer persons in 
need. Small differences in sustained economic growth will have a dramatic impact on the 
fiscal future of society. If real economic growth averages about 2 percent per year between 
now and 2050, then, depending on the policy choices we make, government expenditures 
as a proportion of the economy in 2050 might not be substantially larger than today and 
we will still be able to meet the promises made to future beneficiaries. 
 
It would be foolish to assume society will simply grow its way out of the difficult 
choices that the aging of the population will require. It would be equally foolish to assume 
that the future will be completely dismal if there is no radical restructuring of government 
programs. If public policies support the market transitions necessary for economic growth 
during demographic transitions, then we can afford to meet the challenges of the 
retirement of the baby boom. 
 
The Older Population of Tomorrow Will Be Different 
Life today is different from the past, in part because of demographic and economic 
changes. The population age 65 to 75 is healthier, wealthier, and better educated than 
persons in this age group in past generations. Future groups of older people are likely to be 
even better off. They too will redefine “retirement” and “old age.” 
 
Older persons still remain vulnerable 
Improvements across age groups should not blind us to the fact that certain segments of 
the population age 65 and older remain very vulnerable. Older single women, for 
example, have particularly low average incomes. There is also substantial variation in the 
educational attainment of baby boomers. Because people with more education tend to 
have higher incomes and better health, this educational disparity virtually guarantees a 
diverse group of older people in the future. Current financial disparities are expected to 
persist or grow. And large health and long-term care expenses can substantially drain the 
resources of even those who previously felt financially secure. 
 
Insuring risks 
Social insurance—in the form of Social Security, disability insurance, unemployment 
insurance, and Medicare—is designed to improve the economic security of workers and 
their dependents. These programs, along with private insurance and tax incentives for 
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individual savings and employee benefits, have pooled financial risk and contributed to the 
well-being of American families. However, longer life expectancy has accentuated the 
financial risks of health and long-term care by highlighting increasingly large gaps in public 
programs and private insurance. Some of the gaps in coverage are filled by public 
assistance, such as Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income. However, many gaps are 
not filled, resulting in homelessness, hunger, and higher proportions of unmet and 
uncompensated health care needs. 
 
Policy Matters 
Population growth and change will affect society, but so too will policy choices. Much of 
the concern over the anticipated growth in the older population is related to anxiety about 
the federal budget. The budget issues may be significant, but the federal budget is just one 
facet of the economy. Policymakers must not only evaluate the tax-financed expenditures 
of programs like Medicare and Social Security, they must also consider the net impact 
these expenditures have and changes that would occur if these programs did not exist. 
 
With reasonable economic growth, projected government spending will not be 
substantially larger as a percentage of national income than it is today. With less economic 
growth, tougher choices—related to cutting program benefits or raising taxes—will have 
to be made. But given the likelihood of some economic growth, the debate about future 
government spending is likely to be a debate mostly about how to distribute the additional 
wealth in the economy. 
 
Currently, much of the public discussion about an aging society involves how to 
finance Social Security and Medicare. Resolving this question will have an impact on 
financial security for future age groups but will do little to resolve the implications for 
communities. Reducing the share of public support does not eliminate societal costs, it 
merely leaves individuals and their families responsible for a larger share, and some of 
those costs end up getting shifted back to the public sector through less direct and often 
more expensive means. Families and local communities will face a wide array of issues 
related to education, housing, social services, and transportation that will not be answered 
by cutting, expanding, or restructuring entitlement programs. 
 
The Future Will Bring Challenges that Require Thoughtful  
Attention Now 
Issues related to the aging of our society pale in comparison to the social, political, 
military, and economic challenges our society has already faced. With little planning, 
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society has adjusted to the baby boom and to the consequences of large numbers of 
people moving through the schools, the labor force, and the housing, product, and 
financial markets. 
 
The baby boom is now anticipated to begin moving out of the labor force and 
into the realm of health care, long-term care, and claims on retirement income. Society 
can and will adjust. But the transitions and their consequences will be easier the better 
prepared we are. As policymakers decide on policies to meet this challenge, they must 
recognize that those policies will have to change as everything else changes. This suggests 
maintaining flexibility to allow such changes to be made as the future becomes clearer. 
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PART ONE: THE FUTURE WILL BE DIFFERENT 
The inevitable changing age distribution in the U.S. population, and changes in labor, 
financial, and consumer markets, ensure that the future will be different. Part I examines 
the imperative suggested by demographic change and the economic response that has 
occurred. There are at least four points to keep in mind when considering the 
demographic imperative: 
 
• The United States is substantially “younger” than other industrialized countries. 
Other industrialized nations have already faced and will continue to face aging 
trends that are more pronounced than in the United States. 
• If population projections between now and 2050 turn out to be correct, then the 
number of children plus older persons relative to the working-age population will 
not be as large as it was in 1960. 
• The financing of government programs imposes a substantial challenge, regardless 
of economic growth. However, if real economic growth averages 2 percent or 
more per year, then projected government expenditures in 2050 could be about 
the same proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) as today. 
• Ultimately, the central challenge of an aging society is ensuring that future workers 
are able to produce more than current workers. The changing distribution of 
workers and consumers is likely to encourage greater productivity, but investments 
in education, training, basic science, and technology will also be required. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE DEMOGRAPHIC IMPERATIVE 
The oldest baby boomers are now in their late fifties, and they represent the leading edge 
of an anticipated wave of future seniors. Some people fear that, as baby boomers age, the 
increase in both the numbers and proportion of older people will cause a shift from a 
society that promotes growth and innovation to one preoccupied with caring for 
dependent people. Unprecedented numbers of Social Security and Medicare beneficiaries, 
they say, will soon overwhelm the retirement and health systems as well as the federal 
budget as a whole. 
 
The Population Age 65 and Older Has Already Grown 
The evidence shows, however, that the population age 65 and older has already grown 
dramatically—both in absolute and relative terms—without devastating consequences. The 
population age 65 and older grew rapidly throughout the twentieth century. Between 
1950 and 2000, it nearly tripled, while the total population nearly doubled—from 151 
million to 281 million people (Figure 1-1).4 
 
Figure 1-1. Growth in the Number of People Age 65 and Older
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CENSR-4). Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf.  2010 to 2050 data are from
Population Projections Program. (2000). Projections of the Resident Population by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1999 to 2100 (Middle
Series). Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/natdet.html.
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More People Are Living Longer 
Improvements in life expectancy have increased the proportion of persons age 85 and 
older (Figure 1-2). 
 
Figure 1-2. Population Age 85 and Older (%)
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CENSR-4). Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf. 2050 data are from
Population Projections Program. (2000). Projections of the Resident Population by Age, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin: 1999 to 2100 (Middle
Series). Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/natdet.html.
 
 
In 1900, people age 85 and older were about 0.2 percent of the population, but by 
2000, 1.5 percent of the population was 85 and older. The U.S. Census Bureau projects 
that, by 2050, people age 85 and older will comprise nearly 5 percent of the population. 
 
 
How Big Was the Baby Boom? 
Many commentators talk about the 76 million baby boomers as if no children would 
have been born in the absence of a baby boom. If fertility rates had remained at pre-
World War II rates, there would still have been 64 million children born from 1946 to 
1964. Instead, an extra 12 million children were born. The real “baby boomers” are 
the 12 million additional children born during these years. 
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In the Past 18 Years, Almost as Many Babies Have Been Born as 
During the 18 Years of the Baby Boom 
All the attention to the growth of the older population overlooks the fact that there has 
been a growth in the younger U.S. population as well. Baby boomers had fewer children 
than their parents, but there are now more parents. Hence, in the past 18 years, there have 
been almost as many babies born (75 million) as during the 18 years of the baby boom (76 
million) (Figure 1-3). 
 
Figure 1-3. Number of Live Births, 1945 to 2002
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The Population Profile Will Change 
As the children of baby boomers have children and more people live longer, the top of the 
age pyramid will fill out and become more rectangular. Looking at the pattern up to 1950, 
except for those born during the Depression, each new generation has been larger than 
the one that preceded it (Figure 1-4a). 
 
Figure 1-4a. Population Pyramid, 1950
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By 2000, the population distribution has already become less triangular, reflecting 
falling fertility rates after the baby boom and during the 1970s (Figure 1-4b). By 2050, 
when all of the surviving baby boomers will be age 85 and older, the triangle is expected 
to become a rectangle—indicating that the population will be more evenly distributed 
across generations than it has ever been (Figure 1-4c). 
 
  
11
Figure 1-4b. Population Pyramid, 2000
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Figure 1-4c. Population Pyramid, 2050
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Family Structure Has Changed 
Since 1960, family structure has changed considerably and family relationships have 
become more complex (Table 1-1). 
 
Table 1-1. Changes in Family Structure
Circa 1960 Circa 2000
Men 22.8a 26.9b
Women 20.3a 25.3b
Divorce Rate (per 1,000) 2.2a 4.0c
Divorced Women Age 65 and Older (%) 2.5a 8.0c
Unmarried Household Couples of the Opposite Sex (millions) 0.4 4.9b
Unmarried Household Couples of the Same Sex (millions) NA 0.6b
Births to Unmarried Mothers (%) 21.6a 33.5c
Household Size 3.33a 2.58b
Families Headed by a Single Parent (%) 12.8b 31.7b
Single Parent Families Headed by Fathers (%) 10.3b 18.3b
Sources:
a U.S. Census Bureau (1975). Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Tables Series A 158-159, Series B 216-200,
Series A 160-171, Series B 28-35, and Series A 288-319). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
b U.S. Census Bureau. Families and Living Arrangements, Historical Time Series (Tables UC-1, HH-4, MS-2, and FM-2). Available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html.
c U.S. Census Bureau (2004). Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2003. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-03.html.
Average Age of Marriage
 
 
Men and women both marry later, on average, and divorce rates have risen. The 
number of unmarried household couples—of both opposite and same sex—have increased 
and are now routinely reported by the U.S. Census Bureau. A higher share of babies are 
born to unmarried mothers. And a single parent heads a higher share of families. Families 
are becoming more “vertical,” comprising more generations but fewer family members. 
Successive generations have fewer children, but longer life expectancies. These changes 
relative to two or three decades ago suggest that 40 years from now families are likely to 
organize and define their relations and familial obligations differently. 
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Today’s Older Population Is Less Likely to Live with Relatives and 
More Likely to Live Alone 
The proportion of people age 65 and older living with a spouse has increased slightly since 
1960, but the more significant change is the smaller proportion of older people living with 
other relatives—down from almost one-quarter in 1960 to about 14 percent in 1980 and 
13 percent in 2000. Thus, it is no surprise that the proportion of older people living alone 
increased substantially, from less than 19 percent to 30 percent, during the same period 
(Figure 1-5). 
 
Figure 1-5. Living Arrangements of the Noninstitutionalized Population 
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The share of older widows living alone, for example, rose from 18 percent in 1940 
to 62 percent in 1990, while the share living with adult children declined from 59 to 20 
percent.5 Income growth, particularly the contribution of Social Security benefits, was the 
single most important factor enabling this change.6 
 
Women are more likely to live alone as they get older. The factors that account 
for this are longer life expectancy for women, that women are more likely to be widowed 
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(which is a reflection of the age disparity between husbands and wives), and that older 
women are less likely to remarry than older men. 
 
Family members are less likely to live near one another today than in the past. In a 
1992 study of people age 51 to 61, fewer than half—some 40 percent—reported that they 
had children living within 10 miles.7 In a 1994 study of persons age 70 and older, only 35 
percent said their children lived that close.8 
 
Older Hispanics Are Least Likely to Live Alone Now and in the Future 
Over the next 20 years, relatively little change is expected in the proportion of older 
people who will live alone. There are, however, projected differences by race and 
ethnicity (Figure 1-6). 
 
Figure 1-6. Persons Age 65 and Older Living Alone, by Race, 1990 to 2020 (%)
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Source: Administration on Aging. (1996). Aging into the 21st Century. Available at http://www.aoa.gov/prof/Statistics/statistics.asp.
 
 
Currently, older Hispanic persons are less likely than white non-Hispanics or 
blacks age 65 and older to live alone. Projections indicate that more Hispanic persons 
might live alone in the future, while the proportion of whites living alone may decline. 
Still, the likelihood of living alone will be lower for the Hispanic population age 65 and 
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older. Among older people who live alone or are expected to live alone, the Hispanic 
population is more likely than other racial or ethnic groups to have living children.9 
 
The U.S. Is Younger Than Other Industrialized Countries 
Population aging resulting from declining fertility rates and increasing life expectancies is a 
worldwide phenomenon. Since 1960, older populations in the industrialized countries 
have more than doubled.10 Today, the United States is the youngest of the industrialized 
countries (Figure 1-7). 
 
Figure 1-7. Proportion of the Population Age 65 and Older, 2000 and 2050
13%
16% 16%
18% 17%
16%
12%
25%
27%
30%
33% 34%
26%
21%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Canada France Germany Italy Japan United Kingdom United States
Country
Pe
rc
en
t
2000
2050
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. International Data Base (IDB), Online Demographic Aggregation. Available at
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By 2050, the proportion of the population that is age 65 and older in the United 
States is projected to be considerably smaller than in any of the other industrialized 
nations. People age 65 and older will be 21 percent of the population in the United States 
but 30 percent or more of the population in Germany, Italy, and Japan. 
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Immigration Has a Small Effect on the Age Distribution 
Each decade since the 1940s has seen more immigrants arrive in the United States 
(Figure 1-8). Nearly all immigrants are under the age of 65 and a significant share of the 
immigrant population is under the age of 25. Large numbers of immigrants could have an 
impact on the age distribution. However, the small number of immigrants relative to the 
population has not had a significant effect. 
 
Figure 1-8. Immigration to the United States, 1900 to 2002
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Figure 1-9. Projected Number of Dependents per 100 Working-Age People
What Do Dependency Ratios Mean? 
 
To better understand the economic implications of demographic change, it is convenient 
to examine the ratio of the population of those least likely to be in the labor force to those 
most likely to be in the labor force (Figure 1-9). This snapshot provides a crude indication 
of how much workers will need to produce to support those not working. It is crude 
because employment is not determined by age, and this measure does not enable us to 
account for changes in technology and productivity. 
 
 
In 1960, there were more than 90 persons either age 20 and younger or age 65 
and older being supported by every 100 persons of primary working age. Interestingly, 
the ratio of “dependents” to the working-age population has declined. In fact, by 2010 
it is expected to be substantially less than it was in 1960. After 2010, the number of 
dependents relative to the working-age population is expected to increase, but even by 
2050 it is not expected to be as large as it was in 1960. 
 
Most of the decline in the dependency ratio reflects the decline in the number of 
children per worker. After 2000, most of the anticipated increase in the dependency ratio 
reflects a growing proportion of persons age 65 and older. This shift in the composition of 
the dependency ratio will reflect different needs. 
 
  
18
Population Projections Are Not Certain 
Population projections are uncertain (Figure 1-10). 
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CENSR-4). Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf. 2010 to 2050 data are from
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Figure 1-10. Past and Projected Population Age 65 and Older, 1950 to 2050
 
 
Depending on the assumptions made concerning future mortality and immigration 
rates, the U.S. Census Bureau estimates that the number of people age 65 and older in 
2050 will range from 71 million to 98 million—a difference of 27 million people and 
nearly 40 percent. This uncertainty is really quite remarkable, given the fact that everyone 
who could be age 65 and older between now and 2050 has been born. 
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Projections of People Age 85 and Older Also Vary Substantially 
Projections of the population age 85 and older are even more varied. By 2050 there may 
be anywhere from 16 million to 24 million people age 85 or older—a difference of 8 
million and nearly 50 percent (Figure 1-11). 
 
Figure 1-11. Past and Projected Population Age 85 and Older, 1950 to 2050
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Population Projections Program. (2000). Projections of the Resident Population by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1999 to 2100 (lowest, 
middle, and highest series) [Data file]. Available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/natproj.html.
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The Future Numbers of Older and Younger Working-Age People 
Are Uncertain 
Given the uncertainty of population projections, it is not surprising that projections of the 
ratio of the older population to the working-age population vary (Figure 1-12). 
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Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (Table V.A2) . Washington, DC: SSA. Available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR04/tr04.pdf.
Figure 1-12. Number of People Age 65 and Older per 100 People
Age 20 to 64:  Three Projections
 
 
Most social insurance programs, like Social Security and Medicare, are financed 
primarily by payroll taxes. Thus, variations in the ratio help explain part of the variation in 
the Social Security Trustees’ assessment that the OASDI Trust Funds (Social Security) and 
the Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Funds (Part A of Medicare) could either be depleted 
around 2042 or 2019, respectively, or remain solvent for at least 75 years.11 
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The Older Population Is Projected to Grow Even Older 
Currently, people age 80 and older constitute one-quarter—26 percent—of the older 
population. By 2050, the U.S. Census Bureau’s intermediate projections indicate that this 
share is expected to rise to about 39 percent. From 2000 to 2050, while the population 
age 65 to 79 is projected to increase 95 percent, the population age 80 and older could 
increase 244 percent (Figure 1-13). 
 
Figure 1-13. Older Population by Age
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Sources: 2000 data are from U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Summary File 1 (Table PCT12). Available at http://factfinder.census.gov.
2050 data are from Population Projections Program. (2000). Projections of the Resident Population by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin:
1999 to 2100 (Middle Series). Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/natdet.html.
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The Population Will Be More Racially and Ethnically Diverse 
Minority populations will represent larger proportions of both the population age 65 and 
older and younger than age 65 in future years (Figures 1-14a,b). 
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Available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/tablist.html. 2050 data are from Population Projections Program (2002). Projections of
the Resident Population by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1999 to 2100 (Middle Series). Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/natdet.html.
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Figure 1-14a. Population Under Age 65 by Race and Ethnicity
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Figure 1-14b. Population Age 65 and Older by Race and Ethnicity
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Because of differences in immigration and fertility rates, African American, Asian 
and Pacific Islander, and Hispanic populations are all increasing more rapidly than the 
non-Hispanic white population. Non-Hispanic whites made up 85 percent of the older 
population in 2000, a share that is projected to decline to 64 percent by 2050. Non-
Hispanic whites made up 70 percent of the population under age 65 in 2000, a share that 
is projected to become 50 percent in 2050. Over the same period, the Hispanic 
proportion of the population age 65 and older is expected to more than triple, growing 
from 5 percent in 2000 to 16 percent in 2050, and the Hispanic proportion of the 
population under age 65 is projected to double, from 13 to 26 percent. 
 
The U.S. Population Will Be Better-Educated in the Future 
During the past several decades, the proportion of adults in the United States who have 
not completed high school has decreased, while the proportion of adults with high school 
and college degrees has increased.12 Projections based on data from the U.S. Census 
Bureau suggest that over the next three decades, educational attainment levels among both 
native-born and foreign-born residents will steadily increase (Figure 1-15). 
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Figure 1-15. Projected Educational Attainment of the U.S. Population
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Source: Cheeseman Day, J., & Bauman, K.J. (2000). Have We Reached the Top? Educational Attainment Projections of the U.S.
Population. Working Paper Series No. 43. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at 
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For example, in 2003 about 48 percent of the population has some post-secondary 
education, but by 2028, 56 percent of the population is expected to have attained this 
level of education.13 In fact, improvements in the level of education attained are expected 
to occur in all industrialized countries (Figures 1-16a,b).14 
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Figure 1-16a. Proportion of the Male Population Age 25 to 64
That Has Attained at Least Tertiary-Level Education, 2001 
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Note: “Tertiary” refers to post-secondary educational attainment in which a degree is awarded (includes both occupational and academic degrees).
Source: Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (2001). Education at a Glance, OECD Indicators, 2003 (Table A3.1a).
Available at http://www.oecd.org/els/education/eag2003.
 
 
Figure 1-16b. Proportion of the Female Population Age 25 to 64
That Has Attained at Least Tertiary-Level Education, 2001 
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Source: Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (2001). Education at a Glance, OECD Indicators, 2003 (Table A3.1a).
Available at http://www.oecd.org/els/education/eag2003.
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Although gains in education have occurred and are expected to continue, it is 
important to note that there is still a substantial portion of the population that has 
difficulties acquiring, comprehending, and applying relevant information. The 1992 
National Adult Literacy Survey reported that some 15 to 18 million of the 39 million 
adults age 60 and older in the United States are essentially functionally illiterate. The 
proportion of people with very limited skills in processing information is greater at older 
ages and may in fact increase with age.15 People with lower levels of functional literacy 
face real barriers in understanding and making informed decisions about health and 
financial matters. 
 
Some of the Youngest States Are Expected to Age the Most 
States will be experiencing demographic and market changes differently (Table 1-2). 
 
Table 1-2a. State Rankings of the Proportion of the Population 
Age 65 and Older, 2000 and 2025
Oregon 11.4 25 12.8% 4 24.2%
Montana 11.0 14 13.4% 3 24.4%
Colorado 10.5 48 9.7% 26 20.1%
Idaho 10.2 42 11.3% 10 21.5%
Nevada 10.1 45 11.0% 15 21.0%
Arkansas 9.9 9 14.0% 5 23.9%
West Virginia 9.6 3 15.3% 2 24.9%
North Carolina 9.4 36 12.0% 11 21.4%
Wyoming 9.2 38 11.7% 18 20.9%
Washington 9.0 43 11.2% 24 20.2%
Kentucky 8.8 27 12.5% 14 21.3%
Florida 8.8 1 17.6% 1 26.3%
Oklahoma 8.7 19 13.2% 8 21.9%
Utah 8.7 50 8.5% 41 17.2%
South Carolina 8.6 32 12.1% 19 20.7%
Arizona 8.3 22 13.0% 13 21.3%
North Dakota 8.1 5 14.7% 6 22.8%
Tennessee 8.0 29 12.4% 23 20.3%
Minnesota 7.9 33 12.1% 27 19.9%
Iowa 7.7 4 14.9% 7 22.6%
Vermont 7.6 26 12.7% 22 20.4%
Mississippi 7.5 35 12.1% 29 19.6%
Alabama 7.4 21 13.0% 20 20.5%
Nebraska 7.4 11 13.6% 16 21.0%
South Dakota 7.4 8 14.3% 9 21.7%
Sources: 2000 data are from U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Summary File 1 (Table P12). Available at http://factfinder.census.gov.
2025 data are from U.S. Census Bureau. Detailed State Projections by Single Year of Age, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2025.
Available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/stproj.html.
Percentage Point 
Increase in the 
Population Age 65 and 
Older, 2000 to 2025
State Rank of the Proportion of the Population 
Age 65 and Older
2000 2025
 
 
In fact, many of the states with the largest anticipated increase in older people are 
states that currently have the least infrastructure in place to address the needs of older 
people. Rural and urban areas will also have different experiences relative to the growing 
proportion of older people. About one-fifth—20 percent—of all Americans lived in rural 
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areas in 2000, but the proportion of people age 65 and older living in rural areas was 
somewhat higher at 23 percent.16 
 
Wisconsin 7.4 20 13.1% 21 20.5%
Georgia 7.3 49 9.6% 42 16.9%
New Hampshire 7.0 37 12.0% 33 19.0%
Maine 7.0 7 14.4% 12 21.4%
Indiana 6.9 28 12.4% 31 19.2%
Louisiana 6.8 40 11.6% 35 18.4%
Virginia 6.7 44 11.2% 39 17.9%
Missouri 6.6 13 13.5% 25 20.1%
Ohio 6.3 15 13.3% 28 19.6%
Kansas 6.2 17 13.3% 30 19.5%
Delaware 6.2 23 13.0% 32 19.2%
Texas 6.1 47 9.9% 47 16.1%
Michigan 5.8 30 12.3% 37 18.1%
Pennsylvania 5.3 2 15.6% 17 21.0%
New Mexico 5.2 39 11.7% 43 16.9%
Maryland 5.1 41 11.3% 46 16.4%
Alaska 4.7 51 5.7% 51 10.4%
Massachusetts 4.6 12 13.5% 36 18.1%
Illinois 4.5 34 12.1% 44 16.6%
Rhode Island 4.2 6 14.5% 34 18.8%
Connecticut 4.1 10 13.8% 38 17.9%
New Jersey 4.1 18 13.2% 40 17.3%
New York 3.6 24 12.9% 45 16.5%
Hawaii 2.7 16 13.3% 48 15.9%
California 2.4 46 10.6% 50 13.0%
District of Columbia 1.8 31 12.2% 49 14.0%
State Rank of the Proportion of the Population
Age 65 and Older
2000 2025
Table 1-2b. State Rankings of the Proportion of the Population 
Age 65 and Older, 2000 and 2025
Percentage Point 
Increase in the 
Population Age 65 and 
Older, 2000 to 2025
Sources: 2000 data are from U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Summary File 1 (Table P12). Available at http://factfinder.census.gov.
2025 data are from U.S. Census Bureau. Detailed State Projections by Single Year of Age, Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2025.
Available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/stproj.html.
 
 
What About Tomorrow? 
Longer life expectancies in conjunction with mothers having fewer children ensure that in 
the future there will be a larger proportion of people age 65 and older. By how much is 
somewhat uncertain, because future mortality, fertility, and net immigration rates are 
unknowable. However, improvements in life expectancy suggest the opportunity for 
fundamental changes in how education, family formation, living arrangements, and labor 
force participation are organized over a lifetime. The choices people make will in part be 
affected by the opportunities that are available. These choices, however, can have 
profound impacts on other aspects of society as they permeate through private markets and 
public policies. 
 
To the extent the population projections turn out to be correct, it is quite likely 
that between now and 2050 the number of children plus the number of older persons, 
relative to the working-age population, will be less than it was in 1960. In 1960, for every 
  
28
100 working-age persons there were 90.5 persons age 65 and older or age 20 and 
younger. By 2050 there could be 81.2 older and younger persons for every 100 working-
age persons. Clearly, there will have been a shift from children to older persons. This shift 
will in turn require a shift in budgets, because certain needs, such as child care and 
education, and the sources of financing for those needs, are different from health and 
long-term care needs, for example. On the other hand, older persons can still be engaged 
in the labor market long after age 65 and the savings of older persons are a necessary 
component of financial markets. 
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CHAPTER 2: ECONOMIC GROWTH MATTERS 
Economic growth affords a nation the opportunity to improve standards of living for 
everyone. The greater the rate of real economic growth, the more opportunities there are 
to alter the well-being of individuals in society. Real economic growth reflects the 
increase in national income after removing the price increases. This chapter examines the 
relationship between demographic change, the economy, and real economic growth. 
 
Economic Growth Has Enabled Many People to Enjoy a Higher 
Standard of Living 
From 1940 to 1959, the size of the U.S. economy (in real terms) doubled. It doubled 
again by 1965 and then doubled again by 1987. Since 1987, the economy has expanded, 
on average, 2.9 percent per year in real terms or over 55 percent (Figure 2-1). As a 
consequence, persons born in 1940, who are now 64 years old, have witnessed an 
875 percent increase in standards of living. 
 
Figure 2-1. Real Gross Domestic Product, 1929 to 2003
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Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. National Income Product Accounts Tables (Table 1.1.6). Available at http://www.bea.gov.
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Specialization of skills and advances in technology have significantly changed 
quality of life. Just three decades ago, many of today’s necessities—personal computers, 
personal data assistants, facsimile machines, cellular telephones, digital cameras—were 
luxuries and even fantasies of science fiction. Many older people vividly remember when 
indoor plumbing was the exception in much of the country. 
 
Economic Growth Has Occurred Despite Population Growth 
Real economic growth occurred despite the fact that the population age 65 and older was 
also increasing (Figure 2-2). From 1950 to 2000, the overall population of the United 
States grew about 87 percent. The number of workers nearly doubled, but the number of 
people age 65 and older nearly tripled.17,18 The country’s ability to absorb a tripling of an 
older population and still experience an increase in living standards was related in part to 
advances in productivity and general economic growth. Over this time period, the 
economy, as measured by GDP per capita, increased nearly 200 percent, rising steadily 
from $11,717 in 1950 to $34,760 in 2000 (in 2000 dollars). As of 2003, GDP per capita 
had reached $35,721 (in 2000 dollars). 
 
Figure 2-2.  Real GDP per Capita, 1929 to 2003
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Figure 2-3. Characteristics of Workers and the General Population 
Age 65 or Older, 2000
 
The Changing Labor Force: Employment and People 
 
Almost one-fifth of people age 65 and older—18 percent—are working (Figure 2-3). 
 
 
Many older people continue to work for financial reasons. Others enjoy the income, but 
also find their work gratifying and stimulating. Among all older workers, 94 percent say 
that they really enjoy going to work.19 
 
Attitudes and expectations about retirement and labor force participation are 
different today than in the past. People who work into their later years generally are better 
educated, healthier, and wealthier than their nonworking peers. As a group, they 
contribute energy, experience, and skills. Older workers are participating in the labor 
force in new ways. The distinction between work and retirement is not as clear as it once 
was as some people make a transition from full-time employment to full-time retirement. 
Some older workers phase out of employment by changing from full-time to part-time 
status for some period. Some retirees are returning to the workforce as consultants or part-
time, seasonal, or temporary workers. Compared to the past, fewer jobs today require 
physical labor and therefore more jobs are attractive to older workers. 
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The Composition of the Federal Budget Has Changed 
The growth in the number of people eligible for federal entitlements and the increased 
cost of program benefits have resulted in a shift in the composition of the federal budget 
(Figure 2-4). 
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Figure 2-4. Federal Expenditures as a Percentage of Total Federal 
Government Expenditures, 1962 to 2003 
 
 
After 1970, public expenditures on programs for which older people were primary 
beneficiaries increased. A substantial portion of this shift was accommodated by the decline 
in the proportion of the budget going toward national defense. In 1962, national defense 
outlays equaled 49 percent of the federal budget. Defense outlays remained near 45 
percent through the late 1960s, but then plummeted to 16 percent of the federal budget 
by 1998.20 Since then, the share of the budget going to defense expenditures has 
increased. The Bush administration’s proposed 2005 budget calls for increasing defense 
spending to 19 percent.21 
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Entitlement Programs Account for Over 40 Percent of the  
Federal Budget 
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid expenditures now account for 42 percent of 
federal spending (Figure 2-5). 
 
Figure 2-5. Total Federal Budget, 2003
Total Federal Outlays = $2,157.6 Billion
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Source: Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2004). The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 2005–2014 (Tables F-5, F-7, and F-9).
Washington, DC: CBO. Available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4985&sequence=0.
 
 
Some 84 percent of Social Security benefits are paid directly to people age 65 and 
older and 87 percent of Medicare payments are made on their behalf.22 Although only 9 
percent of Medicaid beneficiaries are age 65 or older, about 27 percent of Medicaid 
expenditures are directed toward care of older persons.23 
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Federal Expenditures on Entitlements Are Expected to Increase 
Given the growing number of older persons and that advances in medical care are usually 
embraced, it is quite likely that the share of the nation’s income going to finance Social 
Security, Medicaid, and Medicare will increase dramatically (Figure 2-6).24 The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released six budget scenarios for the future. In the 
two most extreme sets of assumptions, spending on Social Security, Medicaid, and 
Medicare is assumed to increase from 8 percent of GDP in 1999 to between 13 percent 
and 28 percent of GDP in 2050.25 Most of the difference in the expenditure scenarios 
stems from assumptions concerning health care. CBO assumes that average annual 
expenditures per Medicare beneficiary, for example, will increase between 5 percent (in 
the least expansive scenario) and 8 percent (in the most expansive scenario) per year. 
During the past decade, however, Medicare expenditures per beneficiary increased less 
than 5 percent per year. 
 
Figure 2-6. Projections of Federal Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP
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What a Difference a Year Makes 
Projections are more art than science. Another year of data and refinements in the 
assumptions can result in dramatic differences in projections made for 20 or 30 years away. 
To get a sense of this, consider a series of projections by the Congressional Budget Office 
for the year 2030. 
In May 1998, the Congressional Budget Office had been anticipating that the 
federal budget would have a surplus for most of the next decade. They anticipated that 
national income (GDP) in 2030 would be $33.1 trillion and total government spending 
would be 25 percent of GDP. In December 1999, the CBO modeling had been revised, 
but a surplus was still projected. GDP and total government spending were now expected 
to be 4 percent and 6 percent, respectively, lower than projected 20 months earlier. 
Comparing similar projections of 2030 done in 1999, 2000, and 2003 reveals considerable 
changes in the projections of national income, the size of the government, and the 
expenditures for Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security. CBO did not release long-term 
projections in 2002 and in 2003 they provided a more dramatic range of projection 
scenarios. Our assumption is that Scenario 2 is the most similar to the assumptions used in 
the 1999 and 2000 projections. Scenario 2 can be characterized as a set of assumptions 
reflecting intermediate spending and lower revenues. 
During the time in which these projections were done, the federal budget would 
go from surplus to deficit and the economy through a recession. The business cycle 
reached a peak in March 2001 (industrial production had reached its peak level in 
September 2000), marking the beginning of the recession. The eight-month recession was 
over by November 2001, but by the time of the projections in December 2003, the 
economy had not fully recovered. 
Table 2-1 reflects the change from either projection done in the preceding year or 
the change between 1999 and 2003 for GDP and federal expenditures in 2030. 
 
Sources:
1999 data are from Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (1999). The Long-Term Budget Outlook: An Update (Table 4). Washington, DC: CBO.
Available at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/18xx/doc1806/ltbudg99.pdf.
2000 data are from CBO (2000). The Long-Term Budget Outlook (Table 4). Washington, DC: CBO. Available at
ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/25xx/doc2517/Long-Term%20Budget%20Outlook.pdf.
2002 data are from CBO (2002). A 125-Year Picture of the Federal Government's Share of the Economy, 1950 to 2075. Washington, DC: CBO.
Available at ftp://ftp.cbo/gov/35xx/doc352/125RevisedJuly3.pdf.
2003 data are from CBO (2003). The Long-Term Budget Outlook (Supplemental Tables, Scenarios 1 and 2). Washington, DC: CBO.
Available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4916&sequence=0.
Table 2-1. Change in Spending and GDP Projections for 2030 from Prior Projections
1999–2000 2000–2002 2002–2003 1999–2003
(Scenario 2) (Scenario 2)
Medicare 5% –5% –55% –55%
Medicaid 22% –2% –109% –151%
Social Security 7% 13% –9% 10%
Total Government Expenditures 2% 1% 13% 17%
Nominal GDP 10% 9% –4% 16%
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How Much of the Nation’s Additional Wealth Ought to Be 
Government Spending? 
In 1950, federal spending was less than 15 percent of GDP; however, by 1975, it had 
increased to over 21 percent. Since 1975, federal spending as a percentage of GDP has 
remained between 19 percent and 23 percent. Similarly, state and local government 
spending increased steadily from 6 percent in 1950 to 13 percent of GDP in 1975. The 
proportion declined somewhat after 1975 until 1990, but has increased since. Total 
government spending, then, has increased from 21 percent of GDP in 1950 to more than 
33 percent, but at times has exceeded 36 percent (Figure 2-7). 
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Figure 2-7. Total, Federal, and State and Local Government Expenditures
as a Percentage of GDP, 1950 to 2003
 
 
The fact that government spending has tended to increase with the growth in 
GDP suggests a willingness to spend a growing share of additional wealth through 
government activities. However, most of the increase in the nation’s wealth still remained 
in private hands. 
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Most Workers Will Likely Be Able to Afford the Taxes Necessary 
to Maintain Social Security and Medicare in 2050 
If smaller proportions of workers are able to keep up with the growing demand for the 
products and services they provide, then those workers should eventually see their wages 
and salaries increase (Figure 2-8). The Social Security Trustees assume that if real GDP is 
increasing on average 2.9 percent per year, wages for the average worker will increase 
from about $35,000 in 2004 to over $205,000 in 2050. 
 
Figure 2-8. Wages of the Average Worker Net of Taxes to Finance Social Security, 
Medicare, and the Disability Insurance Program
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http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR04/index.html. The Hospital Insurance (HI) cost rate is from Table II.B8 and II.C21 and the cost of Supplemental
Medical Insurance (SMI) is based on the estimated Government Contributions in Table II.C5 of the Board of Trustees, Federal HI and Federal SMI
Trust Funds (2004). The 2004 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal HI and Federal SMI Trust Funds. Washington, DC: Centers
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If it is assumed that only workers are taxed to fully finance OASDI and HI Trust 
Funds as well as the general revenues assumed to be needed to finance Parts B and D of 
Medicare, then taxes on the worker earning the median wage for Social Security and 
Medicare would need to increase from $4,451 in 2004 to $50,660 in 2050. As expected, 
the rate of increase in taxes would be greater than the rate of increase in wages, but 
nevertheless, wages net of taxes would still have increased about 405 percent, from 
$30,605 in 2004 to $154,508 in 2050. This is an average rate of increase of 3.5 percent per 
year. Clearly this is “affordable,” but the question is whether people will be willing to pay 
the additional taxes to maintain these programs. 
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Higher Growth Reduces the Challenge Society Faces 
In 2002, total government spending exceeded $3 trillion dollars or about 32 percent of 
national income. By 2050, total government spending could range from $23 trillion to 
$65 trillion, depending in large part on assumptions about the growth in health care costs. 
Using the CBO’s middle set of assumptions, however, we can more easily show the 
importance of economic growth in determining the relative burden of expenditures of this 
magnitude (Figure 2-9). The middle set of assumptions used for federal spending and 
applied to state and local spending suggests that by 2050 total government spending could 
be $36 trillion. 
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Figure 2-9. Total Government Spending as a Percentage of GDP, 1995 to 2050
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The CBO assumes that nominal GDP will increase, on average, about 4.4 percent 
per year through 2050.26 At that rate, total government spending could increase from 32 
percent of GDP to 43 percent of GDP. But what if GDP increases a bit more than the 
CBO assumes? Since 1960, nominal GDP increased on average more than 7.1 percent per 
year, so even a 1 percentage point increase to 5.4 percent per year is modest when 
contrasted with historical growth. 
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At a growth rate of 5.4 percent, government spending as a percent of GDP could 
turn out to be about 27 percent. On the other hand, if GDP grows one percentage point 
less than the CBO assumes, government spending as a percent of GDP could be more 
than twice what it is today, at 67 percent of GDP. 
 
Is There a Limit on Federal Taxes? 
Some have argued that the public will not tolerate federal expenditures in excess of 20 
percent of national income.27 Those who make this argument note that whenever federal 
expenditures exceeded 20 percent of national income, there was a legislative response that 
lowered federal expenditures. The implication these observers draw is that policymakers 
chose to cut federal expenditures because expenditures had reached a threshold that the 
public did not tolerate. 
A closer look at the history and timing of tax law changes does not fully support 
this notion. Regardless of the absolute or relative level of taxes or expenditures, there has 
always been political pressure to avoid raising taxes. But, neither tax rates nor government 
spending were cut when government expenditures exceeded 20 percent of national 
income. Each time the proportion fell, it did so because economic growth increased faster 
than the growth in the expenditures and not because taxes were cut. The most recent 
round of tax cuts occurred when federal expenditures as a percent of GDP were at historic 
lows. While there may very well be a limit to the level of taxes the public will tolerate, it 
is hard to define that limit from the historical data. In fact, many of the same arguments 
could have been made 30 years ago, suggesting that the public would not tolerate federal 
expenditures in excess of 15 percent of national income. 
Perhaps there is more concern among voters about what government does with 
taxes than about the relative size of taxes. After all, we are the government. We are the 
employers and the taxpayers. But over a lifetime, we are also the children, parents, and 
grandparents that make up families and communities. 
 
What About Tomorrow? 
Economic growth, more so than demographic change, will affect the financial well-being 
of the nation, government budgets, and individuals’ financial independence. However, 
economic growth requires public and private investments in education, training, basic 
research, applied research, and capital formation. Nor will economic growth eliminate the 
need to confront difficult policy choices. We will, we hope, continue to be able to choose 
how much of our additional wealth should be taxed, and how this revenue is spent: how 
much for current needs and how much for investment in the human, scientific, and 
environmental capital of future generations. The choices will, first and foremost, reflect 
our values, not what we can afford. 
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PART TWO: THE OLDER POPULATION OF 
TOMORROW WILL BE DIFFERENT 
Part II takes a closer look at how demographic changes might affect how people live their 
lives. Much of the concern regarding the capacity of the country to accommodate an 
aging society is based on the needs and contributions of the current population age 65 and 
older. But tomorrow’s older population will almost certainly have different needs, behave 
differently, and, hence, affect markets and public policy differently. There are four 
important considerations in thinking about how the population age 65 and older of the 
future is likely to be different: 
 
• America’s older population is living in a manner that few of them could have 
imagined when they were younger. They are better educated, healthier, and 
wealthier. Tomorrow’s older population could be even better off than today’s 
along these dimensions. 
• Although improvements have occurred for many older persons, not all have 
benefited to the same extent; certain groups remain vulnerable. The gap in 
educational attainment among the baby boomers ensures that tomorrow’s 
generations of older people will be a diverse group. Existing financial disparities are 
likely to persist and grow. Some individuals will be much healthier than others. If 
policies to accommodate older people are to be effective, they must be geared to 
the neediest as well as to the better-educated, the healthier, and the wealthier. 
• Today’s population age 65 and older covers an age span of 40 years. It includes 
vibrant 93-year-olds in good health as well as cognitively impaired 66-year-olds in 
poor health. The older population of today is racially, ethnically, and culturally 
diverse, but future groups of older people can be expected to be even more so. 
• Tomorrow’s older persons are likely to face very different challenges and to have 
opportunities that cannot yet be anticipated. This is because baby boomers will 
bring about changes in society as they age. They will also adapt to changing 
circumstances. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE FINANCIAL OUTLOOK 
There are strong indications that the financial circumstances of the population age 65 and 
older have improved over the last 40 years or so. Median income has increased, more 
people own their homes, and poverty rates have decreased. This is due to economic 
growth and Social Security, Medicare, and other government-sponsored programs, which 
provide a broad base of financial security for older persons. Improvements in financial 
status have not been evenly distributed among the population, however. 
 
The Financial Status of the Current Older Population Has Improved 
Relative to Past Generations 
Generally, with the notable exceptions of the mid-1970s, early 1990s, and early 2000s, 
median income of householders age 65 and older has increased since 1967 (Figure 3-1). 
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Sources: 1967 to 2002 data are from U.S. Census Bureau. Historical Income Tables—Households (Table H-10). Available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income.html. 2002 data are from U.S. Census Bureau. Detailed Income Tabulations—2003 Household
Income (Table HINC-02). Available at http://ferret.bls.census.gov/macro/032003/hhinc/toc.htm.
Figure 3-1. Median Household Income of Householders 
Age 65 and Older, 1967 to 2002
 
 
The improvement reflects the growth of the economy, enhancement of public 
benefit programs, private insurance, and other private initiatives. As people reach age 65 
with higher incomes, retirement benefits from employment, and the enhancements in 
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public programs, older people, as a group, will maintain their financial independence 
longer. Among the more important sources of financial protection is Social Security, which 
began paying benefits in 1940, followed by Medicare, which began providing coverage for 
health care expenditures in 1966. Other significant changes include the health care and 
social services of Medicaid and the Older Americans Act (all effective in 1966), support 
available through the Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI), which was established 
in 1972, the pension protections provided through the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, and subsequent amendments and tax law changes that have 
encouraged and subsidized home ownership and retirement saving. The future financial 
status of the older population will depend on how recent changes in pension plans affect 
future incomes and on the generosity of Social Security and Medicare benefits. 
 
Home Ownership Among the Population Age 65 and Older 
Has Increased 
The increase in home ownership among older people is another indication that 
circumstances have improved (Figure 3-2). In 20 years, the proportion of people age 65 
and older who owned their homes increased by 15 percentage points. Among the 
population age 65 and older, married couples are the most likely to be homeowners. 
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Figure 3-2. Homeownership Rates of the Population Age 65 and Older
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Poverty Rates Have Declined 
As recently as the 1960s, old age was strongly associated with poverty. In 1960, more than 
one-third of the population age 65 and older was poor. Today, one-tenth is poor. By 
1974, the poverty rate for the population age 65 and older had already dropped to half the 
1968 rate. The largest real increases in Social Security benefits occurred during that five-
year period, aided by the annual adjustment of benefits to a cost of living index in 1972. 
The decline in poverty among the population age 65 and older is a major societal 
accomplishment, but poverty rates for this group have remained fairly steady since 1984. 
Children are more likely than adults, however, to live in a poor household and this has 
critical implications for the future as well (Figure 3-3). 
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Figure 3-3. Poverty Rate by Age, 1959 to 2002
 
 
Improvements in Financial Status Have Been Greater for Some Racial 
and Ethnic Groups Than Others 
Although poverty rates have declined for all people age 65 and older, the largest 
improvement since 1959 has occurred among the black population. In recent years, 
poverty rates for older people of Hispanic origin have increased somewhat. Just over one-
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fifth of black and Hispanic elders are poor. The poverty rate for older whites and Asians 
remains considerably lower, however (Figure 3-4). 
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Figure 3-4. Poverty Rate of the Population Age 65 and Older, 
by Race and Ethnicity, 1959 to 2002
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Social Security Is a Critical Element of Financial Security for  
Older People 
In 2001, the vast majority of the population age 65 and older (91%) received Social 
Security benefits, compared with only 69 percent in 1962 (Figure 3-5). 
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Figure 3-5. Percentage of People Age 65 and Older with
Different Sources of Income, 1962 to 2001
 
 
Income from assets and pensions is also more prevalent now than in 1962, 
although the proportion of people with income from assets has declined somewhat in 
recent years. Reliance on public assistance by older people, in contrast, has decreased 
considerably, with 5 percent receiving it in 2001 compared with 14 percent in 1962. 
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Pension Plans Have Changed 
There has been an increase in the number of people participating in retirement plans 
(Figure 3-6). In 2001, for example, almost 39 million people participated in employer-
sponsored retirement plans, compared to almost 30 million in 1992.28 At the same time, 
there have been significant changes in the types of plans offered. 
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Figure 3-6. Number of Active Participants in Defined Benefit
and/or Defined Contribution Plans
 
 
The shift from defined benefit plans, which guarantee a set amount of money 
during retirement, to defined contribution plans, which provide a predetermined amount 
of money for workers to invest, can have an impact on the availability of funds at 
retirement. The shift in plans has also increased the market risk faced by individuals. In 
2001, the proportion of workers whose primary coverage was from a defined contribution 
plan was 79 percent.29 
 
While Their Incomes Have Increased, Older People Are Not Rich 
That poverty rates have fallen and average real incomes have increased for people age 65 
and older does not mean that all older people are well-off (Figures 3-7a,b). 
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Figure 3-7a. Distribution of the Population Age 65 and Older, 
by Income Relative to Poverty Level
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Figure 3-7b. Distribution of the Population Age 65 and Older,
by Income Relative to Poverty Level
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In 1975, about half of the population age 65 and older had incomes lower than 
200 percent of the poverty line. By 2002, this proportion had declined, but nearly 4 out of 
10 people age 65 and older are still poor or near-poor, with incomes at or below 200 
percent of the poverty line ($17,256 for an individual). These persons are vulnerable to 
increases in housing and prescription drug prices, out-of-pocket health care costs, long-
term care expenses, or other unexpected expenses. Many feel financially insecure because 
they are developing health problems and have insufficient funds to cover the care they are 
likely to need. 
 
Older People Are More Likely to Experience Long-Term Poverty 
Poverty rates for the population age 65 and older are not high, overall, relative to other 
age groups. However, for the elderly the duration of poverty is longer, and as people get 
older they are less likely to be able to escape from poverty (Figure 3-8). 
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Figure 3-8. Duration of Poverty for Different Age Groups, 1988 to 1992
 
 
 
  
49
Relative to Other Industrialized Countries, Many Older People in the 
U.S. Are Financially Vulnerable 
In the United States, one-quarter of the older population is financially vulnerable. That is, 
they have incomes that are less than 50 percent of median income. This proportion is 
higher than most other major industrial countries (Figure 3-9). 
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Figure 3-9. Proportion of the Population Age 65 and Older 
Below 50 Percent of Median Income, by Country
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Income Among Older People Is Not Evenly Distributed 
Another economic factor affecting older people is income inequality (Figure 3-10). 
 
Figure 3-10. Distribution of Households, with Householders 
Age 65 and Older, by Annual Household Income Quintile, 2002
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Dividing the total income of the population age 65 and older into five equal dollar 
percentiles (20% shares), or quintiles, is a good way of illustrating the situation. The top 20 
percent of income among everyone age 65 and older, for example, is shared among just 7 
percent of older households, all of which have annual household incomes at or above 
$84,016. The bottom 20 percent of income is spread among 39 percent of older 
households, all of which have annual incomes below $17,916. The next to lowest quintile 
of income is spread among 28 percent of older households, all of which have annual 
incomes between $17,916 and $33,376. Putting the bottom two quintiles together reveals 
that 66.5 percent of older households have annual incomes below $33,377. 
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Income Sources Vary Considerably by Income Level 
Sources of income differ by income quintile (Figure 3-11). 
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Figure 3-11. Share of Income from Various Sources for Married Couples 
Age 65 and Older, by Annual Income Quintile, 2000
 
 
Across all the quintiles, the distribution of the four main sources of income is 
39 percent from Social Security, 24 percent from earnings accounts, 18 percent from 
pensions, and 16 percent from asset income accounts.30 Among older married couples 
in the top quintile of the income distribution (the wealthiest 20%), Social Security 
contributes 15 percent of total income. For all others, Social Security provides 36 percent 
or more of total income. For those whose income is within the bottom two quintiles (the 
poorest 40%), Social Security is critical, providing over 70 percent of total income. 
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Some Groups of Older People Are Particularly Vulnerable 
Some groups of older people are particularly vulnerable (Table 3-1). 
 
All 65 and 
Older Age 65 to 69 Age 70 to 74 Age 75 to 79 Age 80 to 84
Age 85 and 
Older
All 65 and Older* $24,549 $31,434 $26,570 $21,654 $21,535 $17,746
White+ 19,790
Black+ 12,333
Hispanic+ 10,544
All Married Couples* $34,151 $40,482 $35,299 $30,019 $28,933 $26,298
White+ 31,775
Black+ 26,192
Hispanic+ 19,314
Nonmarried Males* $21,683 $24,441 $21,570 $20,379 $22,072 $19,255
White+ 16,537
Black+ 10,192
Hispanic+ 9,926
Nonmarried Females* $16,521 $19,622 $17,575 $15,459 $16,378 $14,861
White+ 12,602
Black+ 8,581
Hispanic+ 7,818
* Based on total family income of all relatives residing in the household.
+ Based on total income of the aged unit within a household. (Aged units are defined as married couples who live together—at least
one of whom is 55 or older—and nonmarried persons age 55 and older).
Source: Social Security Administration (2002). Income of the Population 55 or Older, 2000 (Tables 2.1. and 3.3). Washington, DC:
SSA. Available at http:// www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/income_pop55/2000/index.html.
Table 3-1. Median Household Income of Householders Age 65 and Older,
by Selected Characteristics, 2000
 
 
Generally, married couples in which one person is at least age 65 or older have 
more income than single individuals age 65 or older, and older nonmarried men have 
more income than older nonmarried women. Older whites have substantially more 
income than older blacks or Hispanics. Thus, among people age 65 and older, incomes 
tend to be highest among younger, married, white people, and lowest among older, 
single, Hispanic women. Among nonmarried women age 85 or older, median family 
income in 2000 was $14,861. Among married couples age 65 to 69, it was nearly three 
times as high at $40,482. 
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Wealth Distribution Is Uneven 
Wealth distribution is uneven, as well (Figure 3-12). In 2000, median net wealth among 
people age 65 and older was $108,885. Most of this wealth was in the form of home 
equity. If home equity is excluded, median net wealth of the population age 65 and older 
in 2000 was $23,369. 31 Among older people in the lowest 20 percent of the income 
distribution, median net wealth was $44,346 with home equity included, and about 
$3,500 without it. Among the top 20 percent, median net wealth was $499,015 with 
home equity and $328,432 without it. 
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Figure 3-12. Median Total Net Wealth and Median Net Wealth
Excluding Home Equity of Householders Age 65 and Older,
by Household Monthly Income Quintile, 2000
 
 
Wealth Distribution May Change, but Disparities Will Persist 
As a result of higher education levels, higher wages during working years, higher women’s 
labor force participation, more dual-income families, and the maturation of the pension 
system, larger proportions of older people are projected to hold significantly more 
wealth.32 However, even by 2030, when baby boomers will be 65 or older, almost 19 
percent of the older population is projected to have less than $25,000 in total assets and 26 
percent will have less than $100,000 in total assets (in 2000 dollars) (Figure 3-13).33 
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Figure 3-13. Distribution of Total Assets Among the Population 
Age 65 and Older (in 2000 dollars)
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Implications for Health Care Affordability. Health Affairs 22 (3).
 
 
What About Tomorrow? 
Among persons in the United States age 65 and older, there is a large and growing gap 
between the well-off and poor, and this gap is wider in the United States than in any 
other industrialized nation.34 The challenge for the future is to ensure that some measure 
of financial security will be available for everyone, earlier in life and during later years 
when events such as catastrophic illness or a severe economic downturn can threaten 
individual financial security. 
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CHAPTER 4: FUTURE HEALTH AND LONG-TERM 
CARE NEEDS 
In many respects, today’s population age 65 and older tends to be healthier than the same 
age group in the past. People are living longer than ever and the likelihood of having a 
disability has declined for the older population. More people are taking advantage of 
preventive care and a variety of efforts directed at promoting healthy lifestyles. Yet a large 
and growing proportion of the population is overweight or obese. Living longer has also 
resulted in a greater chance of living with chronic conditions, many of which are also 
conditions that put people at risk of needing long-term care. Thus, despite gains in overall 
health status for the older population, there is tremendous uncertainty about how much 
health and long-term care people will need in the future. 
 
Some segments of the population are healthier than others. Racial and ethnic 
minorities and people with relatively low incomes tend to have more health-related 
problems and fewer resources with which to respond. Differences in health are a primary 
reason for tremendous differences in well-being. Health status is the major factor that 
determines whether people are able to lead active, independent lives. The costs of health 
care and long-term care are important determinants of financial well-being, because these 
costs can substantially drain financial resources. 
 
The Risk of Chronic Conditions Increases with Age 
Since the turn of the twentieth century, the causes and circumstances of death have 
changed. Acute and infectious diseases, such as tuberculosis, influenza, and pneumonia, 
were much more significant causes of death then than they are today. But when an 
individual survives an acute condition, his or her probability of developing a chronic 
health condition increases. Many chronic conditions are disabling. Some of the more 
common and debilitating include arthritis, hypertension, heart disease, cancer, diabetes, 
and having survived a stroke. Among the population age 80 and older, more than one-half 
have arthritis or hypertension and more than one-third have heart disease. Nearly a 
quarter have cancer, about 10 percent have had a stroke, and 11 percent have diabetes 
(Figure 4-1). Many persons age 80 and older have two or more serious conditions. 
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Figure 4-1. Prevalence of Chronic Conditions Among People 
Living in the Community by Age, 2000
 
 
Risk Factors Differ Among Income Groups 
Some people are at risk for chronic conditions because of factors that cannot be modified, 
such as genetic predisposition, gender, and age. Risk factors related to health behaviors 
can be modified, however. A majority of older people in all income groups are at risk 
for chronic conditions because of being overweight and a lack of physical exercise. 
The older low-income population is least likely to exercise and most likely to smoke. 
Strategies to reduce risk factors may be more effective if they target specific populations 
(Figure 4-2a,b). 
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Figure 4-2a. Prevalence of Risk Factors Among People Age 65 to 79, by Income
 
 
Figure 4-2b. Prevalence of Risk Factors Among People Age 80 and Older, by Income
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Minority Older Persons Are Poorer in Health and in Other Resources 
Nonwhites are more likely than whites to have had less education, live in substandard 
housing, and be poor, malnourished, and in bad health. Poverty rates for minority older 
persons relative to their white counterparts have not improved since the 1970s. Poverty 
rates among minority older persons average two to three times the rate of poverty for 
older whites.35 The highest poverty rates—51 percent—are experienced by older Hispanic 
women who live alone or with nonrelatives.36 
Racial differences in wealth are even larger than the differences for income. For 
example, financial assets for white householders age 70 and older are 11 times greater than 
those of blacks and eight times greater than for Hispanics. Some 72 percent of white elders 
receive income from assets compared to only 27 percent of blacks and 37 percent of 
Hispanics.37 
Minorities also suffer disproportionately from major conditions such as 
cardiovascular disease, diabetes, cancer, and hypertension as well as from a variety of other 
illnesses.38 Among older Americans, some 42 percent of blacks and 39 percent of 
Hispanics report fair to poor health compared to 24 percent of whites.39 Life expectancy at 
age 65 is 18 years for whites and 16 years for blacks.40 
Older black and Hispanic persons tend to underuse health care services, a problem 
that is closely related to their ability to pay. Many are uninsured and often go without 
needed health care. Sixty-nine percent of the white population age 65 and older have 
private insurance coverage, compared with 36 percent of the older blacks and 23 percent 
of older people of Hispanic origin.41 In some cases, the inability to pay for health care may 
result in death at an earlier age.42 Health in later life is affected by exposure to pollution 
and toxins earlier in life or by hazardous and physically demanding jobs.43 In addition, 
there are theories (that are yet to have empirical backup) that years of discrimination and 
inequality may affect minority elders’ mental health, and through that, the aging process. 
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Medicare Pays for Just Over Half of Older Americans’ 
Health Care Costs 
The federally financed Medicare program is a major payer for health care services for older 
Americans (Figure 4-3). Substantial public support also comes from the Medicaid 
program. Private insurers pay for 12 percent of expenditures. 
 
Older people finance one-fifth of the cost of services themselves; however, even at 
this level, the cost of health care services represents a substantial portion of income for 
many. For example, out-of-pocket spending for health care accounts for one-third of 
older Medicare beneficiaries’ income.44 
 
Figure 4-3. Personal Health Care Expenditures for Medicare Beneficiaries 
Age 65 and Older, by Source of Payment, 1999
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Note: Personal health care expenditures consist of health care goods and services purchased directly by individuals. They exclude public
program administration costs, the net cost of private health insurance, research by nonprofit groups and government entities, and the value
of new construction put in place for hospitals and nursing homes.
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (1999). Chapter 3. Detailed Tables from the Medicare Beneficiary Survey Data (Table 3.4).
In Health and Health Care of the Medicare Population, 1999. Washington, DC: CMS. Available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/mcbs/PubHHC99.asp.
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Changes in Medical Science, Technology, and Behavior Affect Health Care Needs 
Some individuals have health risks because of factors that cannot be modified, such as 
genetic predisposition, gender, or age. Recent advances in medicine and current 
knowledge about the potential health effects of behavioral change make it reasonable to 
assume that the future health and health care needs of older people will be different from 
those needs today. 
Medications and procedures that could not even have been imagined a few years 
ago have radically changed the way some diseases are treated and have limited the threat 
they pose. While heart disease remains the number one cause of death, patients have a 
much greater chance of surviving a heart attack and controlling heart disease because 
procedures such as coronary angiography, angioplasty, new approaches to cardiac surgery, 
and new medications have been developed. Immunizations for polio, mumps, and chicken 
pox have all but eradicated those diseases. Laser technology has led to new, less invasive 
surgical techniques for many health conditions, such as heart disease, skin cancer, and eye 
problems. Research in biotechnology and genetics is also expanding the prospects for 
future cures. New diseases such as AIDS and the proliferation of cancer offer new 
challenges, but there is also tremendous scientific potential for the twenty-first century. 
Lifestyle choices can affect health and longevity as well. Tobacco use, the most 
preventable cause of death and illness, is responsible for nearly one in five deaths in the 
United States. Nearly one-half of all smokers who do not quit die from a disease caused by 
smoking.45 A healthy diet, along with exercise, is particularly important in reducing the 
rates of obesity among all Americans. Among U.S. adults age 65 and older, 18 percent are 
obese and 40 percent are overweight.46 Overweight adults are at increased risk for 
diabetes, high blood pressure, and heart disease.47 
The extent to which tomorrow’s older populations will adopt healthy lifestyles is 
not known. Neither is the impact that advances in medical science and technology will 
have on the health of the population. What is certain is that in the future, health care 
needs and available responses to those needs will be different from today. The high obesity 
rates for younger populations suggest that the proportion of obese older people will be 
even greater in the future. 
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The Vast Majority of Medicare Beneficiaries Have Some 
Supplemental Insurance Coverage 
Medicare has dramatically improved both the health and financial security of millions of 
older people, as well as younger people with disabilities and end-stage renal disease. Virtually 
all people age 65 and older are eligible for Medicare coverage. Medicare has ensured access 
to medical care, but not all needed health or long-term care services are covered, leading 
many beneficiaries to purchase supplemental policies (Figure 4-4). Most of these, however, 
only cover some out-of-pocket expenses, not the dental and hearing and vision services (for 
example) that don’t come under Medicare. Currently, Medicare does not cover outpatient 
prescription drugs, but a prescription drug benefit will be available to Medicare beneficiaries 
beginning in 2006. 
 
Figure 4-4. Supplemental Coverage of Noninstitutionalized
Medicare Beneficiaries Age 65 and Older, 1999
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Washington, DC: Public Policy Institute, AARP. Available at http://research.aarp.org/health/ib41_hspend.html.
 
 
Despite supplemental coverage, Medicare recipients do have considerable out-of-
pocket liabilities for their health care services as well as for their premiums (Figure 4-5). 
For example, the monthly premium for Part B physician coverage was $66.60 in 2003. 
The deductible for each hospitalization was $876 and a copayment of $219 per day was 
imposed after day 60 until day 90. For days 91 to 150, there is a copay of $438 per day 
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and after day 150 the beneficiary is responsible for all costs. The first 20 days of care in a 
skilled nursing facility following a hospital discharge is covered in full, but copayments of 
$109.50 are imposed for each day thereafter (with a 100-day limit). The new Medicare 
Part D prescription drug benefit will have monthly premiums as well as deductibles and 
copayments. 
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Figure 4-5. Projected Out-of-Pocket Spending as a Share of Income 
Among Groups of Medicare Beneficiaries, 2000 and 2025
 
 
Many Older People Have Substantial Out-of-Pocket 
Health Care Expenses 
Excluding long-term care expenses, the average Medicare beneficiary, age 65 and older, 
spent $3,142 for out-of-pocket costs in 2000 and that amount is projected to increase to 
$5,248 in 2025.48 
 
Almost one-third (30%) of these expenditures are for services not covered by 
Medicare. Some 28 percent of out-of-pocket spending is for supplemental insurance 
premiums, 21 percent is for cost-sharing for Medicare services, and 21 percent is for 
Medicare Part B premiums. These expenses were, on average, about 22 percent of 
household income for older Medicare beneficiaries in 2000 and are expected to increase 
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to almost 30 percent in 2025. Certain groups of Medicare beneficiaries are particularly 
vulnerable. For example, out-of-pocket spending represents more than half of income for 
older low-income women in poor health.49 
 
As People Live Longer, They Are More Likely to Require 
Ongoing Assistance 
About 7 million people age 65 and older need substantial hands-on assistance from others, 
or long-term care. 50 The prevalence of limitations in activities of daily living (ADLs) and 
instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs) increases with age (Figure 4-6). Among 
people age 65 or over, 20 percent have limitations in IADLs. At age 85, over 19 percent 
have limitations in IADLs and another 19 percent have limitations in one or more ADLs. 
 
4.0%
1.8% 1.7%
9.3%
3.9% 3.5%
19.8%
8.2%
10.9%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
IADLs Only 1 or 2 ADLs 3 to 6 ADLs
Level of Functional Limitation
Pe
rc
en
t
65 to 74
75 to 84
85 and older
Figure 4-6. Percentage of Older People with Functional Limitations
Who Need Help from Another Person, 2000
Note: Those with IADLs only said “yes” to needing help with IADLs from another person and “no” to ADL question. Those with ADLs
may or may not have an IADL. Those with 1 or 2 ADLs responded “yes” to needing help with ADLs and “yes” to fewer than three specific 
activity questions. Those with 3 to 6 ADLs responded “yes” to at least three of the follow-up questions about specific activities.
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Broadening the definition to include conditions that make it difficult to perform 
routine activities increases from 7 million to 18 million the number of older people who 
might need assistance.51 The most common conditions leading to disability are arthritis or 
rheumatism, back problems, coronary heart disease, respiratory conditions, hearing 
trouble, stiffness, mental or emotional problems, diabetes, visual impairments, and stroke.52 
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In addition, some people have disabilities related to cognitive impairments, such as senile 
dementia, or physical changes such as loss of strength and agility. 
 
Disability Rates Among Older Populations Have Declined 
Among the population age 65 and older, disability rates remained relatively constant 
during the 1970s. Between 1982 and 1999, however, the proportion of older people with 
a disability declined from 26 to 20 percent (Figure 4-7). This change offers the possibility 
that disability rates may decline in the future. Disability rates among younger people, 
however, have increased. 
 
Figure 4-7. Disability Rates of the Population Age 65 and Older,
by Disability Level, 1982 to 1999
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Source: Manton, K. G., and Gu, X. (2001, May 22). Changes in the prevalence of chronic disability in the United States black and nonblack
population above age 65 from 1982–1999. Proceedings from the National Academy of Sciences 98 (11): 6354–6359.
 
 
Most of the measured decline in disability rates among those age 65 and older has 
been for less severe disabilities. The proportion of people with difficulties in instrumental 
activities of daily living (IADLs) declined at an annual rate of 2.7 percent between 1982 
and 1999. During the same period, the proportion of people with limitations in fairly 
serious activities of daily living (ADLs) declined by 1.4 percent annually.53 
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The net effect of an overall decline in disability rates and an increase in life 
expectancy at older ages may be that the number of years free of disability is increasing, 
but it is becoming more difficult to avoid some level of disability prior to death.54 
 
Race and gender have been factors in disparities in disability rates and the 
measured declines in disability rates; however, the gap between blacks and everyone else 
has narrowed as disability rates declined more among blacks than among others. 
 
The Need for Long-Term Care in the Future Will Increase 
Long-term care refers to assistance and services for people who are limited in their ability 
or unable to perform basic activities, such as bathing or dressing, because of chronic illness 
or disabling conditions. Estimates based primarily on current disability rates and applied to 
the number of people anticipated to be age 65 and older in the future suggest the high 
likelihood that more people will need long-term care (Figure 4-8). These people will need 
a range of different services. 
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Figure 4-8. Projections of the Number of People Age 65 and Older 
Who Will Need Long-Term Care
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The Number of People Using Supportive Services Will 
Increase Substantially 
By 2020, the number of older people expected to use nursing home care and other 
supportive services will increase somewhat (Figure 4-9). In the following years, as the 
older population continues to grow, the need for services will increase substantially. 
Currently, nearly 19 percent of the population age 85 and older lives in nursing homes.55 
Future nursing home residency rates will depend not only on the demand for care, but 
also on the availability of nursing homes and alternatives to nursing home care. 
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Figure 4-9. Projected Number of Older Americans Using 
Supportive Services, 2000 to 2020
 
 
Alternatives to Nursing Home Care Are Growing 
During the last decade, the supply of home- and community-based services has increased 
in response to some people’s preferences for assistance outside of a nursing home (Figure 
4-10). Medicaid has contributed to this by shifting some of the expenditures for nursing 
home care to home- and community-based care. In 2001, Medicaid financed 44 percent 
of long-term care spending in the United States. Most of this spending (71%) was for care 
in institutions such as nursing homes.56 However, the proportion of spending for home- 
and community-based care has more than doubled since 1990, while the proportion spent 
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on nursing home care has declined dramatically. Similar trends are apparent in the private 
sector, where the proportion of expenditures for home health care has increased 
substantially. 
 
Figure 4-10. Proportion of National Long-Term Care Spending for Home- and 
Community-Based Services and Institutions, 1990 to 2002
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Over the past decade, the use of adult day care centers, more extensive home care 
services, assisted living facilities, and hospice services also has increased. 
 
Who Are the Caregivers of Older People? 
Caregivers generally provide assistance for necessary and ongoing activities such as 
shopping, cleaning, managing a household, or performing personal care such as helping 
someone eat, get dressed, use the bathroom, take a bath, or move about the house. Almost 
80 percent of older persons with limitations in these forms of activities live at home or in a 
community-based setting, and receive at least some unpaid, nonprofessional assistance, the 
majority of which comes from family members. Adult children account for 31 percent of 
all unpaid, informal caregivers, and daughters constitute over half—53 percent—of adult 
children caregivers (Figure 4-11).57 But almost 23 percent of caregivers age 50 and older 
are spouses. More wives provide care than husbands. The typical caregiver is a married 
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woman in her mid-forties who works full time, is a high school graduate, and has an 
annual household income of $35,000. There is, however, tremendous diversity around 
this average portrait.58 
 
Figure 4-11. Informal Caregivers of Older People in the Community, 1997
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Source: National Alliance for Caregiving (NAC) & AARP (1997, June). Family Caregiving in the U.S.: Findings from a National Survey.
Washington, DC: NAC and AARP.
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Most People Age 65 and Older Live in Conventional Housing 
The great majority of older people live in conventional housing (Figure 4-12). As the 
number of people who need some assistance grows, there will be an increase in demand 
for housing options to meet these needs. Existing homes can be modified to make day-to-
day living easier for older people, particularly those with disabilities. New homes may be 
explicitly designed to meet the needs of older people. Spouses constitute only 5 percent of 
all informal caregivers. 
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It is remarkable to note that most long-term care is provided by family caregivers 
and that families persist in providing substantial amounts of care despite the presence of 
professional caregivers. Thus, whether a family uses privately or publicly financed 
assistance, family members provide a substantial amount of care. People age 70 and older 
who receive help with basic personal care from their adult children are 60 percent less 
likely than those who do not receive help from their children to use nursing home care 
over a subsequent two-year period. Black and Hispanic elders are substantially more likely 
than whites to receive help from their children.59 
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Long-Term Care Poses a Significant Financial Burden 
Based on recent trends, total expenditures on behalf of people age 65 and older for long-
term care are projected to almost triple by 2040. If cures are found for particularly 
expensive conditions, such as Alzheimer’s disease, expenditures could be lower. But if 
other debilitating conditions affect large portions of the population, expenditures could 
be higher.60 
 
Long-term care poses a significant financial burden for most people (Figure 4-13). 
In 2000, the average annual cost of care in a nursing home was $44,100.61,62 The average 
home health aide visit cost $61.63 At this rate, five visits per week would cost more than 
$15,000 per year and daily visits would cost about $21,000 per year. In comparison, the 
median income in 2001 was $14,152 for people age 65 and older and $13,362 for people 75 
and older. Older people with the lowest incomes are most likely to report that they have 
limitations in basic activities of daily living (Figure 4-14). 
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Figure 4-13. Proportion of People 85 and Older with Income and Assets
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Figure 4-14. Percentage of the Community-Dwelling Older Population
with Limitations, by Income Quartile, 1999
 
 
Out-of-Pocket Expenses for Long-Term Care Are Expected 
to Increase 
Out-of-pocket payments by older people receiving long-term care and their families 
financed more than one-third (38%) of their long-term care costs in 2000. That 
proportion could rise or fall depending on the availability of public and private insurance 
and the cost of care in the future (Figure 4-15). 
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More People Have Purchased Private Long-Term Care Insurance 
Long-term care insurance has only been sold by national insurance companies since the 
mid-1980s. Not surprisingly, there are relatively few people currently using long-term 
care insurance to finance their care. Uncertainty about whether current policies will 
adequately cover services available in the future may make some people wary of 
purchasing long-term care policies. The number of policies sold, however, continues to 
increase (Figure 4-16). In 2001, some 72 percent of the policies ever sold were still in 
force.64 This suggests that roughly six million people—or about 11 percent of people 
age 65 and older—have a long-term care insurance policy. Buyers of long-term care 
insurance tend to be somewhat younger and wealthier than nonbuyers, and are more 
likely to be employed.65 
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Figure 4-16. Long-Term Care Insurance Policies Sold
 
 
What If There Is a Cure? 
The enormous uncertainty related to making predictions about the need for long-term 
care and the cost of care in the future is illustrated by alternative scenarios associated with 
Alzheimer’s disease, which currently affects some four million people in the United States. 
The Alzheimer’s Association estimates that the direct and indirect costs of the disease total 
at least $100 billion each year, making it the third most expensive disease in the United 
States (after heart disease and cancer).66 
The Association predicts that about 14 million Americans will have Alzheimer’s 
disease by the middle of the next century. If researchers develop a cure for Alzheimer’s 
disease, its financial and long-term care burdens will be greatly reduced. If no cure is found 
and more people are affected, the costs will increase. The costs associated with the disease 
could be higher still if new expensive technologies or drugs are developed to test for or 
treat the disease, or if new types of facilities are built specifically for patients with Alzheimer’s. 
More than 7 in 10 Alzheimer’s patients are now treated at home. In a recent 
investigation, patients with moderate-to-severe Alzheimer’s disease who received 
memantine, an experimental treatment, required less caregiver time—45 hours or $815 
per month for a home health aide, on average—than those who did not receive the 
treatment.67 This is just one example of an innovation in managing the disease that could 
also have an impact on costs. 
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What About Tomorrow? 
Advances in life expectancy have not yet meant a reduction in the risk of developing a 
chronic health condition. Many chronic conditions and certainly multiple conditions 
contribute to disability. So too do frailty and cognitive impairments. The anticipated 
increase in the number of people with a disabling condition, in particular, raises a serious 
challenge that is pervasive throughout health care and social services: who will be there to 
care? Families will certainly continue to play a major role in caring for older family 
members and coordinating the services of health care providers. In the future, however, 
the pool of potential caregivers, per person with long-term care needs, is likely to be 
smaller. Increased mobility means that adult children are less likely to live nearby. With 
more women in the workforce, fewer will be at home to provide care. 
 
Current shortages and high turnover rates for paraprofessionals suggest that 
without significant changes in health, long-term care, and labor policies, workforce 
shortages may reach crisis proportions. On an individual level, it is difficult to make 
predictions about the need for health and long-term care services and the potential 
accompanying financial burden. But we do know that collectively the need will be great 
and that efforts to respond to anticipated needs now may help ease the burden later. 
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CHAPTER 5: POLICY CHOICES MATTER 
Public policies establish private property rights, govern private markets, and encourage, 
discourage, or forbid specific behaviors. When markets fail to either efficiently or effectively 
provide the goods and services that are broadly desired or needed, public policies are used 
to either improve the function of the market or provide the goods and services through 
other means. 
 
The policymaking process, however, is far from efficient. Generally, the process is 
more effective at reacting to widely recognized problems than anticipating future problems. 
The further out the anticipated problem, the more difficult it may be to promote policy 
changes. Moreover, once a policy is in place, society’s needs can change faster than the 
political and legislative process is able to respond. Out of necessity then, public policies are 
always evolving. 
 
This chapter examines the types of public policies that could affect future 
circumstances, and identifies key policy challenges posed by an aging society. Here are the 
chapter’s major highlights: 
 
• Policies can promote economic growth, redistribute income, influence individual 
behaviors (including the demographic profile of the population), and therefore change 
the future. 
 
• The changing age distribution creates challenges at all levels of government and for 
persons of all ages. Finding the right balance between pooling risk and financing the 
consequences of those risks is first and foremost a political question and secondarily a 
question of affordability. 
 
• Prudent public policy calls for action today, when the adjustments required will be 
smaller than if society chooses to wait. But, policies should be developed with the 
flexibility to make adjustments as circumstances change, especially since it is not 
always certain how individuals and markets will respond to changing opportunities 
and circumstances. 
 
Policies that Affect Economic Growth 
The keys to furthering economic growth are in the investments made in nurturing and 
educating children, training workers, supporting basic science, and financing the application 
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of scientific knowledge. Do all children born today have the opportunity to be nurtured, 
stimulated, and appropriately fed and housed in a safe environment? Will they have access to 
an education that is able to effectively teach them how to learn? Will they be able to grow up 
in good health and with access to appropriate medical care if they should become sick? Will 
they have ample assistance and opportunity to find their way into higher education or 
vocational training and then have opportunities to apply their skills in the labor market? 
 
Is there sufficient investment in the basic sciences? Will those whose interests and 
talents lie in biology, chemistry, engineering, and physics have the opportunity to build on a 
base of research that will yield new advances in science? Will applied scientists, engineers, and 
entrepreneurs have access to the financial capital to experiment with turning scientific 
advances into new tools for improved productivity? 
 
It is unrealistic to assume that the private market can adequately invest in the well-
being and education of future workers or in the basic science and infrastructure necessary to 
bring scientific knowledge to the point of market-based enterprise. Because of the 
“externalities” inherent in these investments, public financing will be necessary.68 
Entrepreneurs and market forces are necessary, however, to turn knowledge into productivity 
enhancements that will result in economic growth. The application of science and 
technology requires entrepreneurs and skilled workers. 
 
Public policies can influence the life-course of future workers, including education, 
family formation, and supports for workers with children or older parents who need help. 
Public policies can influence labor policy and influence technological advancements in ways 
that will improve labor productivity. Among the relevant policy levers are labor laws; laws 
governing employee benefits and educational programs; tax laws concerning research and 
development; patents; and laws governing international trade. Government policies 
concerning data collection, studies, demonstration projects, and the dissemination of 
information can also influence labor practices, attitudes, and expectations. Government also 
plays a direct role in encouraging scientific and technological advancement, by financing the 
basic research and development that is then made available to private enterprises. 
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What Can We Afford? 
Public policy debates tend to be about what we value, yet most debates eventually narrow to 
the question of what we can afford. Except at the extremes, it is not easy to answer this 
question. We can’t afford to spend all of our national income on government enterprises. To 
do so may entail a diminished standard of living; but how much spending is too much? On 
the other hand, if none of our national income is spent on government programs, we may 
endanger future standards of living. But how much is necessary? Given a national income of 
more than $10 trillion, the range between not spending enough and spending too much is 
enormous. 
At present, about $3.0 trillion of national income is collected through taxes and 
slightly more than $3.2 trillion is spent annually through government activities, resulting in 
an annual deficit of about $200 billion. Clearly, as suggested by the cut in income tax rates in 
2001 and 2002, many argue that we are spending too much. Others, however, might 
disagree because the cut in taxes was not met with an equal cut in expenditures. In fact, 
expenditures have increased, resulting in an increase in deficit spending. 
On September 24, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld appeared before the Senate Committee 
on Appropriations to testify on the President’s emergency supplemental budget request for 
$87 billion for post-military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In his prepared remarks, 
Secretary Rumsfeld posed a rhetorical question: “Is $87 billion a great deal of money? Yes. 
But can we afford it? Without question.”69 His point was that this request was of such high 
value that the money was not an issue. This request was “the price of freedom....” Funding 
this request would send a clear “message to terrorists that we are willing to spend what it 
takes.” 
We were able to “afford” the $87 billion because it was important. Is $87 billion a lot 
of money? Relative to our national income, it is not. But in government program terms, $87 
billion is more than enough money to fund current levels of Head Start for the next 18 years 
(even adjusting for anticipated inflation). Alternatively, $87 billion is enough money to 
finance Medicaid’s current coverage of home- and community-based long-term care for the 
next five years. 
 
Policies That Redistribute Income 
All market-based economies recognize the importance of redistributing income. Public 
policies are not only needed to provide a safeguard for some of the unjust and harsh 
transitional aspects of a market-based economy, but also to efficiently spread the risks that 
people face. The majority of income redistribution in the United States has been through 
social insurance programs such as Social Security, unemployment insurance, Workmen’s 
Compensation, disability insurance, and Medicare. The benefits in these programs are 
available to workers and their dependents who have worked a minimum number of quarters 
in jobs that are required to pay payroll taxes for these programs. For persons unable to work 
or whose work was not covered by the Social Security Act or for some low-income 
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beneficiaries, an array of public assistance programs have been developed, such as Medicaid, 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and Supplemental Security Income. 
 
Social insurance in conjunction with public assistance programs offers protection to 
workers and their dependents when a worker is unemployed, injured, disabled, or dies prior 
to retirement. Social Security provides a public pension for retirees and a survivor’s benefit 
for retirees’ widows. Medicare enhances access to health care, regardless of ability to pay or 
health status. Medicaid has become critical to low-income Medicare beneficiaries with 
chronic health conditions and Medicare beneficiaries with modest incomes but few savings 
who need long-term care. 
 
These programs serve as a critical base of support upon which private insurance, 
deferred compensation, and individual savings can be used to further spread the risks, and 
provide even better income, disability, and health security. Employers in particular, 
encouraged by tax policies, have helped to expand private insurance coverage. 
 
Policies That Influence Behavior 
Social insurance and public assistance programs define collective responsibility and therefore 
clarify individual responsibility. Social insurance programs provide a floor of protection upon 
which private voluntary actions can be built to enhance financial and health security. 
Information, regulation, grants, and tax policy are among the primary public policy tools used 
to clarify and encourage individuals to undertake the responsibility for risks not covered by 
these programs. Public policies and resources can be used to encourage individuals to save; to 
pursue higher education; to enter or leave the workforce at specific times; and to purchase 
various forms of insurance (such as health, life, disability, or long-term care insurance). 
 
The Department of Labor has been engaged in a public education campaign to 
encourage workers to save for retirement. Tax policies also influence savings behavior. Tax 
policies concerning insurance premiums and reserves influence employer decisions about the 
benefits to provide as well as their structure. In addition, public policy affects the scope and 
depth of the types of insurance products offered in the private market. 
 
Government-backed loans can help persons with little to no income pursue higher 
education prior to entering the labor force full time. At the other end, Social Security rules 
affecting retirement benefits can influence when individuals decide to leave the labor force. 
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Policies That Affect Demography 
Public policy can affect the future age distribution in the United States. Such policies include 
those that affect immigration, public health, individual health behaviors, and investments in 
scientific research for biomedical breakthroughs that directly affect mortality or fertility rates, 
as well as policies that affect individual access to medical care. Tax policy can also be used to 
encourage, or more likely lessen, some of the financial barriers that discourage families from 
having children. Currently, for example, family income subject to federal income taxes is 
adjusted for the number of children using both deductions and credits. Deductions for some 
child care expenses are also allowed. 
 
Immigration policy can also affect the number and age distribution of people living in 
the country. Improvements in public health—including activities that ensure safe air and 
water, immunize the population, and promote certain healthy behaviors—have increased life 
expectancy in the United States. Improvement in life expectancy can also be traced to the 
dramatic reduction in infant mortality brought about by better diet and prenatal care. 
Premature babies whose survival would have been considered a miracle 10 years ago 
routinely survive and thrive today, largely because of medical technology. 
 
Scientific and technological advances have also improved care later in life. More 
diseases can be diagnosed and treated today than in the past. And many more people live with 
illnesses that would have been fatal earlier in the century. Direct government-financed 
scientific research has contributed to advances in medical science. Similarly, scientific 
breakthroughs have led to commercial applications, at least in part because of tax and patent 
law policies that encourage corporate research and development. These policies, in 
conjunction with government efforts to increase individual access to medical care, will almost 
certainly continue to improve the life expectancy of older people in the future. 
 
Policy Challenges Posed by an Aging Society 
As the population ages, the needs and wants of older persons will represent a larger 
proportion of the market, and thus their preferences will affect the price and distribution of 
goods and services. The shifts in demand, caused by the changing age distribution of the 
population, are likely to lead to changes in public budgets and in the marketplace. The 
challenges imposed by an aging society, therefore, affect government at multiple levels as well 
as employers and consumers of all ages. 
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The Federal Budget Challenge 
The shift in demand that receives the most public attention is the growing number of Social 
Security and Medicare beneficiaries. A growing proportion of beneficiaries relative to the 
number of workers is likely to impose a fiscal burden on workers. This is not unique to 
Social Security or Medicare. It is an issue that arises when current workers pay for current 
beneficiaries. Beneficiaries of many public programs are not workers. 
 
There is, however, a group of workers and other taxpayers that are also beneficiaries 
of public policies. This includes everyone who qualifies for a provision in the tax code that 
allows them to deviate from the “normal” tax on income.70 The President’s 2004 budget 
identifies over 50 different provisions, called tax expenditures, which effectively result in 
foregone income tax revenues.71 Among the largest tax expenditures are the exclusion for 
medical premiums and medical care, the net exclusion of pension contributions and pension 
earnings, and the deductibility of mortgage interest on owner-occupied homes. These three 
provisions alone resulted in an estimated tax expenditure of $343 billion in 2004. 72 This is 
more than total anticipated expenditures for Medicare. While Medicare’s benefits are not 
distributed based on income, tax expenditures are of disproportionately greater value to 
persons with higher taxable incomes. 73 
 
The public policies that create these tax expenditures, like the public policies that 
created public programs like Medicare, for example, reflect deliberate policy choices. In the 
case of nonwage compensation, the policy choices made are the cornerstone of the voluntary 
employer-provided health insurance, pension, and retirement savings plans. Without these 
preferential tax treatments, employers would not be a part of the health and retirement 
system and the private market for health insurance and pension plans might not even exist. 
However, failure to recognize these revenue losses, or the fact that these preferences 
disproportionately favor higher income taxpayers, biases the discussion about government 
expenditures for other programs like entitlement programs. 
 
Federal Entitlement Programs 
A growing number of older people will, of course, result in more people receiving Social 
Security and Medicare benefits. In addition, there are likely to be more claims on Medicaid 
for long-term care. Given anticipated changes in technology, standards of care, and the cost 
of labor, health and long-term care costs per beneficiary are also likely to increase. Thus, a 
growing number of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid beneficiaries are likely to result 
in greater absolute and per capita public expenditures. 
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While the fiscal burdens imposed by these programs are significant, future economic 
growth and policy choices will determine if these burdens are overwhelming. Ironically, the 
factors underlying the anticipated increases in public expenditures for entitlement programs 
are some of the same factors that could result in additional economic growth. The decline in 
fertility rates relative to the increase in longevity will eventually result in higher real wages. 
Employers will instinctively seek less expensive, labor-saving technologies to produce their 
goods and services and in so doing require fewer highly skilled workers. The growing 
number of older persons not only increases the size of the demand for goods and services, but 
many of these same consumers are part of the potential supply of financial capital necessary to 
implement the technological advances intended to enhance labor productivity. 
 
This suggests that the public policy issues raised by growing entitlement spending 
should not only focus on the rules governing the entitlement program itself, but on ensuring 
economic growth as well. Investing in economic growth requires making specific up-front 
expenditures (the investment) in hopes of realizing an increase in economic growth in the 
future. The amount of economic growth in the future is uncertain, but the expenditures 
necessary for the investment are known. 
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Real Economic Growth of 2.6 Percent Could Be Adequate 
The Congressional Budget Office issued a series of projections based on a wide range of 
assumptions concerning taxes and expenditure rates. Their assumptions lead to increases in 
federal expenditures for Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid from 8 percent of GDP in 
2003 to as high as 28 percent or as low as 13 percent of GDP by 2050.74 The projections 
assume different rates of growth in expenditures and the deficit (owing to different tax rates), 
but not different rates of economic growth. 
For these specific projections, the CBO assumed a real economic growth of 2.3 
percent per year through 2050. This falls within the range of growth assumed by the Social 
Security Trustees. They use a range from 1.5 percent in the high-cost assumptions to 2.7 
percent per year in the low-cost assumptions, with 2.1 percent assumed for the intermediate 
assumptions.75 These assumptions are appropriately prudent, but it should be noted that in 
every decade, except the 1930s, the economy has grown by more than 3 percent per year 
(Figure 5-1). Wishful thinking will not affect economic growth, but public policies can. 
Instead of assuming particular rates of economic growth, perhaps it is worth asking 
what rate of economic growth would be necessary to keep the size of government relative to 
national income below a particular threshold. In 2003, for example, total federal, state, and 
local government spending as a percentage of GDP was about 32 percent. By how much 
would GDP need to increase to keep total government spending at 32 percent of GDP? 
Using the CBO’s assumptions for the fastest-growing health care expenditures, the economy 
as measured by the average annual change in real GDP would need to grow by 3.7 percent 
per year to maintain this 32 percent of national income threshold.76 Using the CBO’s lowest 
assumptions of health care expenditures suggests that the average annual nominal growth in 
GDP would need to be 1.4 percent. 
Although real economic growth of 3.7 percent is optimistic and real economic 
growth of 1.4 percent is pessimistic, a value in between these extremes, of 2.6 percent, is 
certainly achievable. Real economic growth of this magnitude with continual pressure to 
hold down rates of spending growth should be more than sufficient to finance anticipated 
growth in public expenditures. 
Real economic growth has generally (except for the 1930s) exceeded 3 percent per 
year. During some decades, like the 1940s and 1960s, real rates of increase were dramatically 
greater (5.1% and 4.5% per year, respectively). For the 1950s, 1970s, and 1980s, average 
annual rates of growth were about 3.5 percent, while in the 1990s, real economic growth 
was a bit lower (3.2% per year). 
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Figure 5-1. Average Annual Rate of Increase in Real GDP
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Source: Calculations based on  Bureau of Economic Analysis. National Income Product Account Tables (Table 1.1.6). 
Available at http://www.bea.gov.
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The Challenge for Communities 
Entitlement “reforms,” per se, will not resolve the central challenge of an aging society. 
Communities must be able to help those who need help while at the same time ensure that 
the community remains attractive. Vibrant communities attract and retain people of all ages, 
who want to grow older in that community. Decreasing the amount of federal funding can 
increase the risk for communities of having to provide more services financed from a lower 
tax base. 
 
Population aging suggests that there could be a decline in some community needs, 
such as education, child welfare, and juvenile crime, and an increase in demand for health 
and long-term care, senior services, and transportation. Meeting the needs of older persons, 
however, can’t come at the expense of meeting the needs of younger persons without 
jeopardizing the community as a whole. Communities need a tax base, which requires 
employers and workers. Workers, in turn, not only need job choices but a good educational 
system for their children. Communities also need volunteers, leaders, and others to mentor 
and watch out for each other. Older people are often in the best position to serve in these 
  
84
roles, but they want to feel safe and included. To keep older people involved, they will need 
educational and cultural outlets and access to public transportation. 
 
As communities age, the challenge will be to balance objectives. One way of helping 
to do this is to create collaborations among key community stakeholders, such as community 
colleges, schools, churches, employers, and social service agencies. The inability to meet 
service needs will result in migration out of the community, and those who leave first are 
more likely to be persons the community can least afford to lose. If people with the greatest 
resources leave the community, it will be those with both the fewest resources and greatest 
social service and medical needs that remain. 
 
Given that every community is at a very different starting point, it may make sense 
for some communities to reconsider their boundaries. Some communities are too small, 
while others are quite large but contain diverse subcommunities within them. This may 
require reconsidering the community from a regional perspective. 
 
Market-Based Challenges of an Aging Society 
The changing composition of the population can also lead to a broader set of challenges in 
the marketplace. Two sectors that deserve special consideration are education and health care. 
These sectors share similarities—they are relatively labor intensive, depend on highly 
educated workers, and are less likely to offer benefits from gains in productivity. The labor 
markets for educators and health care workers are also similar. The demand for their labor 
tends to be dominated by one or two large employers within each community. As a 
consequence, despite shortages of teachers, nurses, nurse’s aides, and home-care workers, 
salaries of these professions have not increased at a level commensurate with the increased 
demand for their services.77 
 
Lower salaries among health care workers and educators, however, have not slowed 
expenditures for the cost of health or long-term care or education. Higher education and 
health care costs have been increasing faster than the growth in GDP.78 Education costs prior 
to college have also been increasing, but it is harder to measure the increase, because tuition 
is not paid at public schools. Budgets have increased, but because costs have increased faster 
than most school system budgets, programs have been cut and capital expenditures delayed. 
 
Higher expenditures impose trade-offs with other goods and services, and limit access 
for some. Underfinanced education prior to college and financial barriers to higher education 
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can impede economic growth. Higher health care expenditures may limit access to needed 
health care and impede financial security.79 
 
 
Changes in Spending at One Level of Government Can Influence Spending 
at Another Level 
Federal spending and tax policies affect spending and revenues at state and local levels of 
government (Figure 5-2). Lower federal subsidies for projects and services provided by state 
and local governments clearly leave state and local governments with the decision whether or 
not to increase spending to match the reduction in federal support. State and local spending 
as a proportion of total government spending has hovered around 30 percent since 1962, but 
grew faster than federal spending through the early 1970s, despite the Vietnam War and the 
federal war on poverty. To some extent, this growth in expenditures reflected the efforts of 
state and local governments to meet the social service and educational needs of the baby 
boomers as they matriculated into elementary and high school. 
State and local spending reached a peak of nearly 35 percent in 1973, when nearly 
half of all baby boomers were still school-aged. State and local spending, as a percentage of 
total government spending, declined to about 28 percent by 1984, by which time the 
youngest baby boomer had graduated high school. From the late 1970s through the mid-
1980s, however, federal expenditures increased faster than state and local expenditures and, 
therefore, the relative share of government expenditures from state and local government 
declined, until quite recently. Steady and substantial declines in the rate of growth in federal 
spending have in fact resulted in substantial increases in state and local government spending. 
Rising property values and substantial capital gains from the sale of appreciated stocks helped 
to finance the services paid for by states. The subsequent and dramatic decline in the value of 
the stock market along with the increase in unemployment has resulted in revenue shortfalls 
in 30 states, leading to extremely difficult budget decisions during a time in which federal 
spending has also been cut. 
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Figure 5-2. State and Local Government Expenditures as a Percentage of 
Total Government Expenditures, 1960 to 2003
(numbers in billions of 2000 dollars)
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Meeting the Challenges of an Aging Society 
A critical question is how best to use public policies to improve standards of living for 
everyone as society ages. This is a matter of encouraging economic growth and pooling the 
risks that individuals face over their lifetimes. 
 
No doubt, demographic changes will affect the future. But the future is also affected 
by the choices we make. A growing number of economists, demographers, and other analysts 
have begun to evaluate the simultaneous relationships among demographic changes and the 
economy. Individual responses culminate in societal responses that can affect the labor 
market, the market for goods and services, living arrangements, and public policy. The 
economy, public policy, and the adaptations individuals and institutions make will affect the 
future. Consequently, anticipating the future simply by focusing on the anticipated growth 
and changing age distribution of the population is much too simplistic. 
 
Public policy can change expectations, and changing expectations can influence how 
people behave in the various spheres in which they operate. Public policy can also provide the 
information and incentives for people, communities, and institutions to invest in the future in 
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ways that will support economic growth. Public policy can also help direct resources to those 
with the greatest need, and can insure risks that are not insurable in the private market. Through 
deliberate actions, public policy can affect educational attainment, family formation, labor force 
participation, and the demand for goods and services upon which economic growth depends. 
 
Much of what will occur in the future and how certain changes will affect the rest of 
society are not yet known. This does not mean action is not warranted. In fact, the sooner 
we commit to investing in the future and set priorities for action, the greater our options will 
be. Policymakers must make policies keeping in mind that the policy choices made will affect 
the future. Perhaps this will encourage policymakers to recognize the need for incremental 
changes as circumstances change. Anticipating the future and acting accordingly will change 
the future itself. 
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APPENDIX:  
DETAILED TABLES OF TIME-SERIES FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-1. Growth in the Number of People Age 65 and Older 
Sources: 1900 to 2000 data are from Hobbs, F., & Stoops, N. (2002). Demographic Trends in the 20th Century (Census 2000 
Special Reports, CENSR-4). Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at: http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/ 
censr-4.pdf. 2010 to 2050 data are from Populations Projections Program (2000). Projections of the Resident Population by Age, 
Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1999 to 2100 (Middle Series). Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/natdet.html. 
 
Note: The total population data for 1900 to 2000 include unknown age data. Therefore, the data used to determine the proportion 
of the population under age 65 and age 65 and older do not sum to equal the total population. 
 
 
 Total Under 65 65+ 
 Number in 
Thousands 
Number in 
Thousands 
Percent Number in 
Thousands 
Percent 
1900 75,995 72,713 96% 3,080 4% 
1910 91,972 87,854 96% 3,950 4% 
1920 105,711 100,629 95% 4,933 5% 
1930 122,775 116,047 95% 6,634 5% 
1940 131,669 122,650 93% 9,019 7% 
1950 150,697 138,428 92% 12,270 8% 
1960 179,323 162,764 91% 16,560 9% 
1970 203,212 183,146 90% 20,066 10% 
1980 226,546 200,996 89% 25,549 11% 
1990 248,710 217,468 87% 31,242 13% 
2000 281,422 246,430 88% 34,992 12% 
2010 299,862 260,148 87% 39,715 13% 
2020 324,927 271,195 83% 53,733 17% 
2030 351,070 280,752 80% 70,319 20% 
2040 377,350 300,174 80% 77,177 20% 
2050 403,687 321,687 80% 81,999 20% 
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Figure 1-3. Number of Live Births, 1945 to 2002 
 
Sources: 1945 to 1959 data are from U.S. Census Bureau (1975). Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial 
Times to 1970, Part 1. Washington, DC: GPO. 1960 to 2002 data are from National Center for Health Statistics. (2003). 
Births: Final Data for 2002. National Vital Statistics Report Vol. 52, No. 9. 
Year Number 
(in thousands) 
Year Number 
(in thousands) 
1945 2,858 1974 3,160 
1946 3,411 1975 3,144 
1947 3,817 1976 3,168 
1948 3,637 1977 3,327 
1949 3,649 1978 3,333 
1950 3,632 1979 3,494 
1951 3,823 1980 3,612 
1952 3,913 1981 3,629 
1953 3,965 1982 3,681 
1954 4,078 1983 3,639 
1955 4,104 1984 3,669 
1956 4,218 1985 3,761 
1957 4,308 1986 3,757 
1958 4,255 1987 3,809 
1959 4,245 1988 3,910 
1960 4,258 1989 4,041 
1961 4,268 1990 4,158 
1962 4,167 1991 4,111 
1963 4,098 1992 4,065 
1964 4,028 1993 4,000 
1965 3,760 1994 3,953 
1966 3,606 1995 3,900 
1967 3,521 1996 3,892 
1968 3,502 1997 3,881 
1969 3,600 1998 3,942 
1970 3,731 1999 3,959 
1971 3,556 2000 4,059 
1972 3,258 2001 4,026 
1973 3,137 2002 4,022 
    
Live Births, 
1946-1964 75,874 
Live Births, 
1984-2002 74,915 
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Figure 1-4a, 1-4b, and 1-4c. Population Pyramids 
(numbers are in thousands) 
 
 1950 2000 2050 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Total 150,697 281,422 403,687 
Under 5 8,236 5.5% 7,927 5.3% 9,811 3.5% 9,365 3.3% 13,748 3.4% 13,165 3.3%
5 to 9 6,715 4.5% 6,485 4.3% 10,523 3.7% 10,026 3.6% 13,475 3.3% 12,891 3.2%
10 to 14 5,660 3.8% 5,459 3.6% 10,520 3.7% 10,008 3.6% 13,548 3.4% 12,954 3.2%
15 to 19 5,311 3.5% 5,305 3.5% 10,391 3.7% 9,829 3.5% 13,694 3.4% 13,021 3.2%
20 to 24 5,606 3.7% 5,876 3.9% 9,688 3.4% 9,276 3.3% 13,243 3.3% 12,811 3.2%
25 to 29 5,972 4.0% 6,270 4.2% 9,799 3.5% 9,583 3.4% 12,502 3.1% 12,603 3.1%
30 to 34 5,625 3.7% 5,892 3.9% 10,322 3.7% 10,189 3.6% 12,532 3.1% 12,822 3.2%
35 to 39 5,518 3.7% 5,729 3.8% 11,319 4.0% 11,388 4.0% 12,459 3.1% 12,694 3.1%
40 to 44 5,070 3.4% 5,134 3.4% 11,129 4.0% 11,313 4.0% 12,091 3.0% 12,345 3.1%
45 to 49 4,526 3.0% 4,544 3.0% 9,890 3.5% 10,203 3.6% 11,375 2.8% 11,698 2.9%
50 to 54 4,129 2.7% 4,144 2.7% 8,608 3.1% 8,978 3.2% 10,965 2.7% 11,408 2.8%
55 to 59 3,630 2.4% 3,605 2.4% 6,509 2.3% 6,961 2.5% 10,917 2.7% 11,528 2.9%
60 to 64 3,038 2.0% 3,022 2.0% 5,137 1.8% 5,669 2.0% 10,210 2.5% 10,989 2.7%
65 to 69 2,425 1.6% 2,578 1.7% 4,400 1.6% 5,133 1.8% 9,237 2.3% 10,239 2.5%
70 to 74 1,629 1.1% 1,783 1.2% 3,903 1.4% 4,955 1.8% 7,716 1.9% 8,822 2.2%
75 to 79 1,002 0.7% 1,151 0.8% 3,045 1.1% 4,371 1.6% 6,552 1.6% 7,856 1.9%
80 to 84 505 0.3% 620 0.4% 1,835 0.7% 3,111 1.1% 5,353 1.3% 6,872 1.7%
85+ 237 0.2% 340 0.2% 1,227 0.4% 3,013 1.1% 7,431 1.8% 11,921 3.0%
Sources: 1950 and 2000 data are from Hobbs, F., & Stoops, N. (2002). Demographic Trends in the 20th Century (Census 2000 
Special Reports, Series CENSR-4). Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf. 2050 data are from Population Projections Program. (2000). Projections of 
the Resident Population by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1999 to 2100 (Middles Series). Washington, DC: U.S. Census 
Bureau. Available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/natdet.html. 
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Figure 1-10. Past and Projected Population Age 65 and Older,  
1950 to 2050 (numbers are in thousands) 
 
 Historical Lowest Series Middle Series Highest Series 
1950 12,270    
1960 16,560    
1970 20,066    
1980 25,549    
1990 31,242    
2000 34,992    
2010  39,067 39,715 40,511 
2020  51,779 53,733 56,194 
2030  66,188 70,319 75,704 
2040  70,017 77,177 87,111 
2050  71,239 81,999 98,313 
Sources: 1950 to 2000 data are from Hobbs, F., & Stoops, N. (2002). Demographic Trends in the 20th Century (Census 
2000 Special Reports, CENSR-4). Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at: 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf. 2010 to 2050 data are from Populations Projections Program (2000). 
Projections of the Resident Population by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1999 to 2100 (Middle Series). Washington, 
DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/natproj.html. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-11. Past and Projected Population Age 85 and Older, 
1950 to 2050 (numbers are in thousands) 
 
 Historical Lowest Series Middle Series Highest Series 
1950 577    
1960 929    
1970 1,511    
1980 2,240    
1990 3,080    
2000 4,240    
2010  5,650 5,786 5,947 
2020  6,334 6,763 7,293 
2030  8,023 8,931 10,107 
2040  12,422 14,284 16,784 
2050  16,139 19,352 23,865 
Sources: 1950 to 2000 data are from Hobbs, F., & Stoops, N. (2002). Demographic Trends in the 20th Century (Census 
2000 Special Reports, CENSR-4). Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at: 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf. 2010 to 2050 data are from Populations Projections Program (2000). 
Projections of the Resident Population by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1999 to 2100 (Middle Series). Washington, 
DC: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/natproj.html. 
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Figure 1-12. Number of People Age 65 and Older per 100 People Age 
20 to 64: Three Projections 
 
 Intermediate High Mortality Low Mortality 
2005 20.3 20.2 20.3 
2010 20.9 20.7 21.2 
2015 23.4 22.9 24.0 
2020 27.0 25.9 28.0 
2025 31.2 29.6 32.9 
2030 34.9 32.5 37.5 
2035 36.8 33.5 40.3 
2040 37.3 33.2 42.0 
2045 37.5 32.6 43.2 
2050 38.0 32.4 44.8 
Source: The Board of Trustees, Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance. (2004). 2004 Annual 
Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds 
(Table V.A2). Washington, DC: Social Security Administration. Available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR04/tr04.pdf. 
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Figure 2-1. Real Gross Domestic Product, 1929 to 2003 
(in billions of 2000 dollars) 
 
Year Gross Domestic 
Product 
Year Gross Domestic 
Product 
1929 865.2 1966 3,399.1 
1930 790.7 1967 3,484.6 
1931 739.9 1968 3,652.7 
1932 643.7 1969 3,765.4 
1933 635.5 1970 3,771.9 
1934 704.2 1971 3,898.6 
1935 766.9 1972 4,105 
1936 866.6 1973 4,341.5 
1937 911.1 1974 4,319.6 
1938 879.7 1975 4,311.2 
1939 950.7 1976 4,540.9 
1940 1,034.1 1977 4,750.5 
1941 1,211.1 1978 5,015 
1942 1,435.4 1979 5,173.4 
1943 1,670.9 1980 5,161.7 
1944 1,806.5 1981 5,291.7 
1945 1,786.3 1982 5,189.3 
1946 1,589.4 1983 5,423.8 
1947 1,574.5 1984 5,814 
1948 1,643.2 1985 6,054 
1949 1,634.6 1986 6,264 
1950 1,777.3 1987 6,475 
1951 1,915 1988 6,743 
1952 1,988.3 1989 6,981 
1953 2,079.5 1990 7,113 
1954 2,065.4 1991 7,101 
1955 2,212.8 1992 7,337 
1956 2,255.8 1993 7,533 
1957 2,301.1 1994 7,836 
1958 2,279.2 1995 8,032 
1959 2,441.3 1996 8,329 
1960 2,501.8 1997 8,704 
1961 2,560 1998 9,067 
1962 2,715.2 1999 9,470 
1963 2,834 2000 9,817 
1964 2,998.6 2001 9,866 
1965 3,191.1 2002 10,083 
  
 
2003 10,398 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. National Income Product Accounts Tables (Table 
7.1). Available at http://www.bea.gov. 
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Figure 2-2. Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita, 1929 to 2003 
(in 2000 dollars) 
 
Year Gross Domestic 
Product 
Year Gross Domestic 
Product 
1929 $7,099 1966 $17,290 
1930 $6,418 1967 $17,533 
1931 $5,960 1968 $18,196 
1932 $5,152 1969 $18,573 
1933 $5,056 1970 $18,391 
1934 $5,567 1971 $18,771 
1935 $6,021 1972 $19,555 
1936 $6,761 1973 $20,484 
1937 $7,065 1974 $20,195 
1938 $6,769 1975 $19,961 
1939 $7,256 1976 $20,822 
1940 $7,827 1977 $21,565 
1941 $9,079 1978 $22,526 
1942 $10,644 1979 $22,982 
1943 $12,220 1980 $22,666 
1944 $13,053 1981 $23,007 
1945 $12,766 1982 $22,346 
1946 $11,241 1983 $23,146 
1947 $10,925 1984 $24,593 
1948 $11,206 1985 $25,382 
1949 $10,957 1986 $26,024 
1950 $11,717 1987 $26,664 
1951 $12,412 1988 $27,514 
1952 $12,668 1989 $28,221 
1953 $13,032 1990 $28,429 
1954 $12,719 1991 $28,007 
1955 $13,389 1992 $28,556 
1956 $13,410 1993 $28,940 
1957 $13,435 1994 $29,741 
1958 $13,088 1995 $30,128 
1959 $13,782 1996 $30,881 
1960 $13,840 1997 $31,886 
1961 $13,932 1998 $32,833 
1962 $14,552 1999 $33,904 
1963 $14,971 2000 $34,760 
1964 $15,624 2001 $34,576 
1965 $16,420 2002 $34,981 
   
 
2003 $35,721 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. National Income Product Accounts Tables  
(Table 7.1). Available at http://www.bea.gov. 
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Figure 2-4. Federal Expenditures as a Percentage of Total Federal 
Government Expenditures, 1962 to 2003 
 
  Social Security Medicare Medicaid Other Mandatory  
  Billions of Dollars Percent Billions of Dollars Percent Billions of Dollars Percent Billions of Dollars Percent 
1962 $14.0 13.1% $0.0 0.0% $0.1 0.1% $20.6 19.3%
1963 $15.5 13.9% $0.0 0.0% $0.2 0.2% $20.5 18.4%
1964 $16.2 13.7% $0.0 0.0% $0.2 0.2% $22.5 19.0%
1965 $17.1 14.5% $0.0 0.0% $0.3 0.3% $22.3 18.9%
1966 $20.3 15.1% $0.5 0.4% $0.8 0.6% $21.8 16.2%
1967 $21.3 13.5% $3.2 2.0% $1.2 0.8% $25.2 16.0%
1968 $23.3 13.1% $5.1 2.9% $1.8 1.0% $29.5 16.6%
1969 $26.7 14.5% $6.3 3.4% $2.3 1.3% $29.3 16.0%
1970 $29.6 15.1% $6.8 3.5% $2.7 1.4% $33.4 17.1%
1971 $35.1 16.7% $7.5 3.6% $3.4 1.6% $40.9 19.5%
1972 $39.4 17.1% $8.4 3.6% $4.6 2.0% $48.4 21.0%
1973 $48.2 19.6% $9.0 3.7% $4.6 1.9% $54.2 22.1%
1974 $55.0 20.4% $10.7 4.0% $5.8 2.2% $59.4 22.0%
1975 $63.6 19.1% $14.1 4.2% $6.8 2.0% $84.9 25.5%
1976 $72.7 19.6% $16.9 4.5% $8.6 2.3% $90.9 24.4%
1977 $83.7 20.5% $20.8 5.1% $9.9 2.4% $89.3 21.8%
1978 $92.4 20.1% $24.3 5.3% $10.7 2.3% $100.0 21.8%
1979 $102.6 20.4% $28.2 5.6% $12.4 2.5% $103.8 20.6%
1980 $117.1 19.8% $34.0 5.8% $14.0 2.4% $126.1 21.3%
1981 $137.9 20.3% $41.3 6.1% $16.8 2.5% $143.4 21.1%
1982 $153.9 20.6% $49.2 6.6% $17.4 2.3% $150.3 20.2%
1983 $168.5 20.8% $55.5 6.9% $19.0 2.4% $167.6 20.7%
1984 $176.1 20.7% $61.0 7.2% $20.1 2.4% $148.4 17.4%
1985 $186.4 19.7% $69.6 7.4% $22.7 2.4% $169.5 17.9%
1986 $196.5 19.8% $74.2 7.5% $25.0 2.5% $166.1 16.8%
1987 $205.1 20.4% $79.9 8.0% $27.4 2.7% $161.8 16.1%
1988 $216.8 20.4% $85.7 8.1% $30.5 2.9% $172.0 16.2%
1989 $230.4 20.1% $94.3 8.2% $34.6 3.0% $189.3 16.6%
1990 $246.5 19.7% $107.4 8.6% $41.1 3.3% $231.9 18.5%
1991 $266.8 20.1% $114.2 8.6% $52.5 4.0% $268.8 20.3%
1992 $285.2 20.6% $129.4 9.4% $67.8 4.9% $234.4 17.0%
1993 $302.0 21.4% $143.1 10.2% $75.8 5.4% $217.1 15.4%
1994 $316.9 21.7% $159.5 10.9% $82.0 5.6% $227.7 15.6%
1995 $333.3 22.0% $177.1 11.7% $89.1 5.9% $219.0 14.4%
1996 $347.1 22.2% $191.3 12.3% $92.0 5.9% $228.3 14.6%
1997 $362.3 22.6% $207.9 13.0% $95.6 6.0% $230.5 14.4%
1998 $376.1 22.8% $211.0 12.8% $101.2 6.1% $250.4 15.2%
1999 $387.0 22.7% $209.3 12.3% $108.0 6.3% $272.8 16.0%
2000 $406.0 22.7% $216.0 12.1% $117.9 6.6% $290.4 16.2%
2001 $429.4 23.0% $237.9 12.8% $129.4 6.9% $297.5 16.0%
2002 $452.1 22.5% $253.7 12.6% $147.5 7.3% $368.9 18.3%
2003 $470.6 21.8% $274.2 12.7% $160.7 7.45% $373.5 17.31%
Source: Congressional Budget Office (CBO). (2004). The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 2005–2014  
(Tables F-5, F-7, and F-9). Washington, DC: CBO. Available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4985&sequence=0. 
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 Figure 2-4. Federal Expenditures as a Percentage of Total Federal 
Government Expenditures, 1962 to 2003 (continued) 
 
 Defense Other Discretionary Net Interest Total 
  Billions of Dollars Percent Billions of Dollars Percent Billions of Dollars Percent Billions of Dollars 
1962 $52.6 49.3% $19.5 18.3% $6.9 6.5% $106.8 
1963 $53.7 48.2% $21.6 19.4% $7.7 6.9% $111.3 
1964 $55.0 46.4% $24.1 20.3% $8.2 6.9% $118.5 
1965 $51.0 43.1% $26.8 22.7% $8.6 7.3% $118.2 
1966 $59.0 43.9% $31.1 23.1% $9.4 7.0% $134.5 
1967 $72.0 45.7% $34.5 21.9% $10.3 6.5% $157.5 
1968 $82.2 46.2% $35.8 20.1% $11.1 6.2% $178.1 
1969 $82.7 45.0% $34.6 18.8% $12.7 6.9% $183.6 
1970 $81.9 41.9% $38.4 19.6% $14.4 7.4% $195.6 
1971 $79.0 37.6% $43.5 20.7% $14.8 7.0% $210.2 
1972 $79.3 34.4% $49.2 21.3% $15.5 6.7% $230.7 
1973 $77.1 31.4% $53.3 21.7% $17.3 7.0% $245.7 
1974 $80.7 30.0% $57.5 21.3% $21.4 7.9% $269.4 
1975 $87.6 26.4% $70.4 21.2% $23.2 7.0% $332.3 
1976 $89.9 24.2% $85.7 23.1% $26.7 7.2% $371.8 
1977 $97.5 23.8% $99.6 24.3% $29.9 7.3% $409.2 
1978 $104.6 22.8% $114.1 24.9% $35.5 7.7% $458.7 
1979 $116.8 23.2% $123.2 24.4% $42.6 8.5% $504.0 
1980 $134.6 22.8% $141.7 24.0% $52.5 8.9% $590.9 
1981 $158.0 23.3% $149.9 22.1% $68.8 10.1% $678.2 
1982 $185.9 24.9% $140.1 18.8% $85.0 11.4% $745.7 
1983 $209.9 26.0% $143.4 17.7% $89.8 11.1% $808.4 
1984 $228.0 26.8% $151.4 17.8% $111.1 13.0% $851.9 
1985 $253.1 26.7% $162.7 17.2% $129.5 13.7% $946.4 
1986 $273.8 27.6% $164.7 16.6% $136.0 13.7% $990.4 
1987 $282.5 28.1% $161.7 16.1% $138.6 13.8% $1,004.1 
1988 $290.9 27.3% $173.5 16.3% $151.8 14.3% $1,064.5 
1989 $304.0 26.6% $184.8 16.2% $169.0 14.8% $1,143.6 
1990 $300.1 23.9% $200.5 16.0% $184.3 14.7% $1,253.2 
1991 $319.7 24.1% $213.6 16.1% $194.4 14.7% $1,324.4 
1992 $302.6 21.9% $231.2 16.7% $199.3 14.4% $1,381.7 
1993 $292.4 20.7% $247.0 17.5% $198.7 14.1% $1,409.5 
1994 $282.3 19.3% $259.1 17.7% $202.9 13.9% $1,461.9 
1995 $273.6 18.0% $271.3 17.9% $232.1 15.3% $1,515.8 
1996 $266.0 17.0% $266.7 17.1% $241.1 15.5% $1,560.5 
1997 $271.7 17.0% $275.5 17.2% $244.0 15.2% $1,601.3 
1998 $270.2 16.3% $281.9 17.1% $214.1 13.0% $1,652.6 
1999 $275.5 16.2% $296.5 17.4% $229.8 13.5% $1,701.9 
2000 $295.0 16.5% $319.8 17.9% $223.0 12.5% $1,788.8 
2001 $306.1 16.4% $343.2 18.4% $206.2 11.1% $1,863.9 
2002 $348.9 17.3% $385.5 19.2% $171.0 8.5% $2,011.0 
2003 $404.9 18.77% $420.8 19.50% $153.10 7.10% $2,157.60 
Source: Congressional Budget Office (CBO). (2004). The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 2005–2014  
(Tables F-5, F-7, and F-9). Washington, DC: CBO. Available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4985&sequence=0. 
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Figure 2-7. Total Federal, State, and Local Government 
Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP, 1950 to 1976 
 
 GDP Total Government Federal Government State and Local Government
 Billions of Dollars Billions of DollarsPercentBillions of DollarsPercent Billions of Dollars Percent 
1950 $293.8 $59.3 20.2% $43.3 14.7% $18.6 6.3% 
1951 $339.3 $69.7 20.5% $53.3 15.7% $19.4 5.7% 
1952 $358.3 $79.7 22.2% $62.1 17.3% $20.7 5.8% 
1953 $379.4 $85.5 22.5% $66.8 17.6% $22.0 5.8% 
1954 $380.4 $84.3 22.2% $64.2 16.9% $23.7 6.2% 
1955 $414.8 $87.4 21.1% $65.3 15.7% $25.9 6.2% 
1956 $437.5 $92.2 21.1% $68.3 15.6% $28.0 6.4% 
1957 $461.1 $102.3 22.2% $76.0 16.5% $30.8 6.7% 
1958 $467.2 $110.6 23.7% $81.4 17.4% $34.2 7.3% 
1959 $506.6 $115.8 22.9% $83.6 16.5% $36.9 7.3% 
1960 $526.4 $122.9 23.3% $86.7 16.5% $40.2 7.6% 
1961 $544.7 $132.1 24.3% $92.8 17.0% $43.8 8.0% 
1962 $585.6 $142.8 24.4% $101.1 17.3% $46.8 8.0% 
1963 $617.7 $151.1 24.5% $106.4 17.2% $50.3 8.1% 
1964 $663.6 $159.2 24.0% $110.8 16.7% $54.9 8.3% 
1965 $719.1 $170.4 23.7% $117.6 16.4% $60.0 8.3% 
1966 $787.8 $192.8 24.5% $135.7 17.2% $67.2 8.5% 
1967 $832.6 $220.0 26.4% $156.2 18.8% $75.5 9.1% 
1968 $910.0 $246.8 27.1% $173.5 19.1% $86.0 9.5% 
1969 $984.6 $266.7 27.1% $183.8 18.7% $97.5 9.9% 
1970 $1,038.5 $294.8 28.4% $201.1 19.4% $113.0 10.9% 
1971 $1,127.1 $325.3 28.9% $220.0 19.5% $128.5 11.4% 
1972 $1,238.3 $355.5 28.7% $244.4 19.7% $142.8 11.5% 
1973 $1,382.7 $385.6 27.9% $261.7 18.9% $158.6 11.5% 
1974 $1,500.0 $435.8 29.1% $293.3 19.6% $178.7 11.9% 
1975 $1,638.3 $508.2 31.0% $346.2 21.1% $207.1 12.6% 
1976 $1,825.3 $549.9 30.1% $374.3 20.5% $226.3 12.4% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. National Income Product Accounts Tables (Tables 1.1.5, 3.1, 3.2, and 3.31). 
Available at http://www.bea.gov. 
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Figure 2-7. Total Federal, State, and Local Government 
Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP, 1977 to 2003 
 
 GDP Total Government Federal Government State and Local Government
 Billions of DollarsBillions of DollarsPercentBillions of DollarsPercent Billions of Dollars Percent
1977 $2,030.9 $597.7 29.4% $407.5 20.1% $246.8 12.2% 
1978 $2,294.7 $653.4 28.5% $450.0 19.6% $268.9 11.7% 
1979 $2,563.3 $726.5 28.3% $497.5 19.4% $295.4 11.5% 
1980 $2,789.5 $842.8 30.2% $585.7 21.0% $329.4 11.8% 
1981 $3,128.4 $962.9 30.8% $672.7 21.5% $362.7 11.6% 
1982 $3,255.0 $1,072.6 33.0% $748.5 23.0% $393.6 12.1% 
1983 $3,536.7 $1,167.5 33.0% $815.4 23.1% $423.7 12.0% 
1984 $3,933.2 $1,256.6 31.9% $877.1 22.3% $456.2 11.6% 
1985 $4,220.3 $1,366.1 32.4% $948.2 22.5% $498.7 11.8% 
1986 $4,462.8 $1,459.1 32.7% $1,006.0 22.5% $540.7 12.1% 
1987 $4,739.5 $1,535.8 32.4% $1,041.6 22.0% $578.1 12.2% 
1988 $5,103.8 $1,618.7 31.7% $1,092.7 21.4% $617.6 12.1% 
1989 $5,484.4 $1,735.6 31.6% $1,167.5 21.3% $666.5 12.2% 
1990 $5,803.1 $1,872.6 32.3% $1,253.5 21.6% $730.5 12.6% 
1991 $5,995.9 $1,976.7 33.0% $1,315.0 21.9% $793.3 13.2% 
1992 $6,337.7 $2,140.4 33.8% $1,444.6 22.8% $845.0 13.3% 
1993 $6,657.4 $2,218.4 33.3% $1,496.0 22.5% $886.0 13.3% 
1994 $7,072.2 $2,290.8 32.4% $1,533.1 21.7% $932.4 13.2% 
1995 $7,397.7 $2,397.6 32.4% $1,603.5 21.7% $978.2 13.2% 
1996 $7,816.9 $2,492.1 31.9% $1,665.8 21.3% $1,017.5 13.0% 
1997 $8,304.3 $2,568.6 30.9% $1,708.9 20.6% $1,058.3 12.7% 
1998 $8,747.0 $2,633.4 30.1% $1,734.9 19.8% $1,111.2 12.7% 
1999 $9,268.4 $2,741.0 29.6% $1,787.6 19.3% $1,186.3 12.8% 
2000 $9,817.0 $2,886.5 29.4% $1,864.4 19.0% $1,269.5 12.9% 
2001 $10,100.8 $3,056.4 30.3% $1,967.3 19.5% $1,365.4 13.5% 
2002 $10,480.8 $3,224.0 30.8% $2,100.7 20.0% $1,427.9 13.6% 
2003 $10,987.9 $3,426.4 31.2% $2,263.9 20.6% $1,501.5 13.7% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. National Income Product Accounts Tables (Tables 1.1.5, 3.1, 3.2, and 3.31). 
Available at http://www.bea.gov. 
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Figure 2-8. Wages of the Average Worker Net of Taxes to Finance 
Social Security, Medicare, and the Disability Insurance Program 
 
 Average Wages Wages Net of Taxes   Average Wages Wages Net of Taxes 
2002 $33,477 $33,477 2026 $80,646 $65,686 
2003 $33,892 $33,892 2027 $82,715 $67,041 
2004 $35,057 $30,605 2028 $86,853 $69,975 
2005 $36,507 $32,013 2029 $90,991 $72,926 
2006 $37,908 $33,487 2030 $95,128 $75,849 
2007 $39,402 $34,804 2031 $97,645 $77,612 
2008 $41,021 $36,206 2032 $100,163 $79,361 
2009 $42,671 $37,588 2033 $105,197 $83,038 
2010 $44,382 $39,027 2034 $110,232 $86,687 
2011 $46,143 $40,483 2035 $115,267 $90,187 
2012 $47,988 $41,961 2036 $118,328 $92,312 
2013 $49,850 $43,442 2037 $121,390 $94,424 
2014 $50,872 $44,243 2038 $127,513 $98,903 
2015 $53,756 $46,416 2039 $133,636 $103,365 
2016 $55,154 $47,488 2040 $139,759 $107,694 
2017 $56,552 $48,499 2041 $143,465 $110,266 
2018 $59,349 $50,582 2042 $147,170 $112,825 
2019 $62,146 $52,638 2043 $154,582 $118,249 
2020 $64,942 $54,643 2044 $161,993 $123,678 
2021 $66,647 $55,852 2045 $169,404 $128,952 
2022 $68,351 $57,032 2046 $173,874 $132,076 
2023 $71,760 $59,494 2047 $178,345 $135,186 
2024 $75,169 $61,905 2048 $187,286 $141,653 
2025 $78,578 $64,230 2049 $196,227 $148,172 
       2050 $205,168 $154,508 
Sources: These calculations assume that the full cost of these programs is financed by workers. Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and 
Disability Insurance (OASDI) cost rates are from Table VI.B1 and Average Wages are from Table VI.F7 in The Board of Trustees, 
Federal OASDI. (2004) The 2004 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the OASDI Trust Funds. Washington, DC: Social Security 
Administration. Available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR04/index.html. The Hospital Insurance (HI) cost rate is from Table II.B8 
and II.C21 and the cost of Supplemental Medical Insurance (SMI) is based on the estimated Government Contributions in Table II.C5 
of the Board of Trustees, Federal HI and Federal SMI Trust Funds. (2004). The 2004 Annual Report of the Board Trustees of the Federal 
HI and Federal SMI Trust Funds. Washington, DC: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/publications/trusteesreport/default.asp?. Income tax data is from the Internal Revenue Service. (2003). 
Internal Revenue Service Data Book, 2002 (Publication No. 55B). Available at  
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=102174,00.html. Total income taxes were then increased by the assumed rate of increase in 
average wages provided in Table VI.F7 of the Board of Trustees, Federal OASDI. (2004). 
Note: Taxes on the average worker assumes ONLY workers finance OASI, DI, HI, and the general revenues needed for Parts B and D 
of Medicare. 
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Figure 2-9. Total Government Spending as a Percentage of GDP, 
1995 to 2022 (numbers in billions of dollars) 
 
 Less 1 Percentage Point CBO Assumed Economic Growth Plus 1 Percentage Point
1995 $7,400.5 33% $7,400.5 33% $7,400.5 33% 
1996 $7,813.2 33% $7,813.2 33% $7,813.2 33% 
1997 $8,318.4 32% $8,318.4 32% $8,318.4 32% 
1998 $8,781.5 31% $8,781.5 31% $8,781.5 31% 
1999 $9,274.3 31% $9,274.3 31% $9,274.3 31% 
2000 $9,824.7 31% $9,824.7 31% $9,824.7 31% 
2001 $10,082.2 32% $10,082.2 32% $10,082.2 32% 
2002 $10,446.2 33% $10,446.2 33% $10,446.2 33% 
2003 — — — — — — 
2004 $10,983.9 32% $10,835.8 33% $10,983.9 32% 
2005 $11,451.8 32% $11,405.7 32% $11,671.4 32% 
2006 $11,949.3 32% $12,015.3 32% $12,411.9 31% 
2007 $12,508.8 32% $12,698.1 32% $13,241.4 30% 
2008 $13,059.8 32% $13,384.4 32% $14,089.5 30% 
2009 $13,617.7 32% $14,090.0 31% $14,973.2 30% 
2010 $14,181.9 33% $14,814.7 31% $15,893.0 29% 
2011 $14,746.8 33% $15,552.9 31% $16,843.9 29% 
2012 $15,314.8 33% $16,307.5 31% $17,829.5 29% 
2013 $15,907.7 34% $17,101.8 31% $18,876.3 28% 
2014 $16,529.9 34% $17,941.9 31% $19,992.2 28% 
2015 $17,132.5 34% $18,775.3 31% $21,120.8 28% 
2016 $17,771.4 35% $19,663.2 31% $22,330.9 28% 
2017 $18,398.3 35% $20,553.5 31% $23,565.2 27% 
2018 $19,022.4 36% $21,456.3 32% $24,836.0 27% 
2019 $19,643.1 36% $22,370.9 32% $26,143.0 27% 
2020 $20,268.1 37% $23,306.4 32% $27,497.7 27% 
2021 $20,900.8 37% $24,267.0 32% $28,906.0 27% 
2022 $21,567.5 38% $25,283.7 33% $30,406.2 27% 
Sources: Historic and projected GDP and federal expenditure data are from Congressional Budget Office. (2003). 
Long-Term Budget Outlook (Supplemental Data Tables). Washington, DC: CBO. Available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4916&sequence=0. Center on an Aging Society’s calculations of projected state 
and local expenditures are based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. National Income Product Accounts 
Tables (Table 3.3). Available at http://www.bea.gov. 
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Figure 2-9. Total Government Spending as a Percentage of GDP, 
2023 to 2050 (numbers in billions of dollars) 
 
 
Less 
1 Percentage Point 
CBO Assumed 
Economic Growth 
Plus 
1 Percentage Point 
2023 $22,250.8 39% $26,337.6 33% $31,977.7 27% 
2024 $22,980.0 40% $27,464.1 33% $33,665.2 27% 
2025 $23,716.9 40% $28,619.5 33% $35,418.1 27% 
2026 $24,491.1 41% $29,839.9 34% $37,282.6 27% 
2027 $25,295.5 42% $31,118.4 34% $39,252.8 27% 
2028 $26,127.7 43% $32,453.4 34% $41,329.3 27% 
2029 $26,984.9 44% $33,842.7 35% $43,511.8 27% 
2030 $27,873.1 44% $35,294.9 35% $45,814.1 27% 
2031 $28,788.8 45% $36,807.4 35% $48,235.5 27% 
2032 $29,735.3 46% $38,385.6 36% $50,786.1 27% 
2033 $30,712.9 47% $40,031.5 36% $53,471.6 27% 
2034 $31,724.2 48% $41,749.9 36% $56,301.6 27% 
2035 $32,767.1 49% $43,539.9 37% $59,278.4 27% 
2036 $33,843.5 50% $45,405.5 37% $62,411.3 27% 
2037 $34,954.8 51% $47,350.6 37% $65,709.0 27% 
2038 $36,102.8 52% $49,379.2 38% $69,181.2 27% 
2039 $37,282.3 53% $51,486.3 38% $72,825.0 27% 
2040 $38,499.9 54% $53,682.6 38% $76,659.9 27% 
2041 $39,752.2 55% $55,965.6 39% $80,686.6 27% 
2042 $41,040.7 56% $58,339.3 39% $84,915.7 27% 
2043 $42,368.9 57% $60,810.7 40% $89,362.1 27% 
2044 $43,735.1 58% $63,379.6 40% $94,030.8 27% 
2045 $45,139.7 59% $66,048.9 40% $98,931.3 27% 
2046 $46,586.1 60% $68,825.9 41% $104,080.1 27% 
2047 $48,071.9 62% $71,709.2 41% $109,481.2 27% 
2048 $49,602.3 63% $74,709.3 42% $115,156.3 27% 
2049 $51,177.2 64% $77,828.4 42% $121,115.7 27% 
2050 $52,802.2 65% $81,077.8 43% $127,383.5 27% 
Sources: Historic and projected GDP and federal expenditure data are from Congressional Budget Office. (2003). 
Long-Term Budget Outlook (Supplemental Data Tables). Washington, DC: CBO. Available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4916&sequence=0. Center on an Aging Society’s calculations of projected 
state and local expenditures are based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. National Income Product 
Accounts Tables (Table 3.3). Available at http://www.bea.gov. 
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Figure 3-1. Median Household Income 
of Householders Age 65 and Older, 
1967 to 2002 
 
 Median Income (in 2001 dollars) 
1967 $12,396 
1968 $13,732 
1969 $13,776 
1970 $13,810 
1971 $14,413 
1972 $15,288 
1973 $15,817 
1974 $16,617 
1975 $16,196 
1976 $16,351 
1977 $16,363 
1978 $17,502 
1979 $17,802 
1980 $17,867 
1981 $18,420 
1982 $19,389 
1983 $19,757 
1984 $20,752 
1985 $20,797 
1986 $21,334 
1987 $21,523 
1988 $21,456 
1989 $21,742 
1990 $22,136 
1991 $21,515 
1992 $21,187 
1993 $21,414 
1994 $21,379 
1995 $22,027 
1996 $21,846 
1997 $22,834 
1998 $23,566 
1999 $24,231 
2000 $23,727 
2001 $23,118 
2002 $23,152 
Sources: 1967 to 2001 data are from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Historical Income Tables—Households (Table H-10). Available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income.html. 2002 data are from the 
U.S. Census Bureau. Detailed Income Tabulations—2003 Household 
Income (Table HINC-02). Available at 
http://ferret.bls.census.gov/macro/032003/hhinc/toc.htm. 
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Figure 3-3. Poverty Rate by Age, 1959 to 2001 (numbers in thousands) 
 
 Under 18 18 to 64 65 and Older 
  Below Poverty Level  Below Poverty Level  Below Poverty Level
 Total Number Percent Total Number Percent Total Number Percent 
2001 72,021 11,733 16.3% 175,685 17,760 10.1% 33,769 3,414 10.1% 
2000 71,741 11,587 16.2% 173,638 16,671 9.6% 33,566 3,323 9.9% 
1999 71,731 12,109 16.9% 169,141 16,982 10.0% 32,621 3,167 9.7% 
1998 71,338 13,467 18.9% 167,327 17,623 10.5% 32,394 3,386 10.5% 
1997 71,069 14,113 19.9% 165,329 18,085 10.9% 32,082 3,376 10.5% 
1996 70,650 14,463 20.5% 163,691 18,638 11.4% 31,877 3,428 10.8% 
1995 70,566 14,665 20.8% 161,508 18,442 11.4% 31,658 3,318 10.5% 
1994 70,020 15,289 21.8% 160,329 19,107 11.9% 31,267 3,663 11.7% 
1993 69,292 15,727 22.7% 159,208 19,781 12.4% 30,779 3,755 12.2% 
1992 68,440 15,294 22.3% 157,680 18,793 11.9% 30,430 3,928 12.9% 
1991 65,918 14,341 21.8% 154,684 17,586 11.4% 30,590 3,781 12.4% 
1990 65,049 13,431 20.6% 153,502 16,496 10.7% 30,093 3,658 12.2% 
1989 64,144 12,590 19.6% 152,282 15,575 10.2% 29,566 3,363 11.4% 
1988 63,747 12,455 19.5% 150,761 15,809 10.5% 29,022 3,481 12.0% 
1987 63,294 12,843 20.3% 149,201 15,815 10.6% 28,487 3,563 12.5% 
1986 62,948 12,876 20.5% 147,631 16,017 10.8% 27,975 3,477 12.4% 
1985 62,876 13,010 20.7% 146,396 16,598 11.3% 27,322 3,456 12.6% 
1984 62,447 13,420 21.5% 144,551 16,952 11.7% 26,818 3,330 12.4% 
1983 62,334 13,911 22.3% 143,052 17,767 12.4% 26,313 3,625 13.8% 
1982 62,345 13,647 21.9% 141,328 17,000 12.0% 25,738 3,751 14.6% 
1981 62,449 12,505 20.0% 139,477 15,464 11.1% 25,231 3,853 15.3% 
1980 62,914 11,543 18.3% 137,428 13,858 10.1% 24,686 3,871 15.7% 
1979 63,375 10,377 16.4% 135,333 12,014 8.9% 24,194 3,682 15.2% 
1978 62,311 9,931 15.9% 130,169 11,332 8.7% 23,175 3,233 14.0% 
1977 63,137 10,288 16.2% 128,262 11,316 8.8% 22,468 3,177 14.1% 
1976 64,028 10,273 16.0% 126,175 11,389 9.0% 22,100 3,313 15.0% 
1975 65,079 11,104 17.1% 124,122 11,456 9.2% 21,662 3,317 15.3% 
1974 66,134 10,156 15.4% 122,101 10,132 8.3% 21,127 3,085 14.6% 
1973 66,959 9,642 14.4% 120,060 9,977 8.3% 20,602 3,354 16.3% 
1972 67,930 10,284 15.1% 117,957 10,438 8.8% 20,117 3,738 18.6% 
1971 68,816 10,551 15.3% 115,911 10,735 9.3% 19,827 4,273 21.6% 
1970 69,159 10,440 15.1% 113,554 10,187 9.0% 19,470 4,793 24.6% 
1969 69,090 9,691 14.0% 111,528 9,669 8.7% 18,899 4,787 25.3% 
1968 70,385 10,954 15.6% 108,684 9,803 9.0% 18,559 4,632 25.0% 
1967 70,408 11,656 16.6% 107,024 10,725 10.0% 18,240 5,388 29.5% 
1966 70,218 12,389 17.6% 105,241 11,007 10.5% 17,929 5,114 28.5% 
1965 69,986 14,676 21.0% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1964 69,711 16,051 23.0% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1963 69,181 16,005 23.1% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1962 67,722 16,963 25.0% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1961 66,121 16,909 25.6% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1960 65,601 17,634 26.9% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1959 64,315 17,552 27.3% 96,685 16,457 17.0% 15,557 5,481 35.2% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Historical Poverty Tables from the Current Population Survey—People (Table 3). Available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty.html. 
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Figure 3-4. Poverty Rate of the Population Age 65 and Older, 
by Race and Ethnicity, 1959 to 2001 (numbers in thousands) 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Historical Poverty Tables from the Current Population Survey—People (Table 3). Available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty.html. 
 
 
All Races White 
 Below Poverty Level  Below Poverty Level  
Total Number Percent Total Number Percent 
1959 15,557 5,481 35.2% (NA) 4,744 33.1% 
1966 17,929 5,114 28.5% 16,514 4,357 26.4% 
1967 18,240 5,388 29.5% 16,791 4,646 27.7% 
1968 18,559 4,632 25.0% 17,062 3,939 23.1% 
1969 18,899 4,787 25.3% (NA) 4,052 23.3% 
1970 19,470 4,793 24.6% (NA) 4,011 22.6% 
1971 19,827 4,273 21.6% (NA) 3,605 19.9% 
1972 20,117 3,738 18.6% (NA) 3,072 16.8% 
1973 20,602 3,354 16.3% (NA) 2,698 14.4% 
1974 21,127 3,085 14.6% 19,206 2,460 12.8% 
1975 21,662 3,317 15.3% 19,654 2,634 13.4% 
1976 22,100 3,313 15.0% 20,020 2,633 13.2% 
1977 22,468 3,177 14.1% 20,316 2,426 11.9% 
1978 23,175 3,233 14.0% 20,950 2,530 12.1% 
1979 24,194 3,682 15.2% 21,898 2,911 13.3% 
1980 24,686 3,871 15.7% 22,325 3,042 13.6% 
1981 25,231 3,853 15.3% 22,791 2,978 13.1% 
1982 25,738 3,751 14.6% 23,234 2,870 12.4% 
1983 26,313 3,625 13.8% 23,754 2,776 11.7% 
1984 26,818 3,330 12.4% 24,206 2,579 10.7% 
1985 27,322 3,456 12.6% 24,629 2,698 11.0% 
1986 27,975 3,477 12.4% 25,173 2,689 10.7% 
1987 28,487 3,563 12.5% 25,602 2,704 10.6% 
1988 29,022 3,481 12.0% 26,001 2,593 10.0% 
1989 29,566 3,363 11.4% 26,479 2,539 9.6% 
1990 30,093 3,658 12.2% 26,898 2,707 10.1% 
1991 30,590 3,781 12.4% 27,297 2,802 10.3% 
1992 30,430 3,928 12.9% 27,256 2,989 11.0% 
1993 30,779 3,755 12.2% 27,580 2,939 10.7% 
1994 31,267 3,663 11.7% 27,985 2,846 10.2% 
1995 31,658 3,318 10.5% 28,436 2,572 9.0% 
1996 31,877 3,428 10.8% 28,464 2,667 9.4% 
1997 32,082 3,376 10.5% 28,553 2,569 9.0% 
1998 32,394 3,386 10.5% 28,759 2,555 8.9% 
1999 32,621 3,167 9.7% 28,880 2,409 8.3% 
2000 33,566 3,323 9.9% 29,703 2,584 8.7% 
2001 33,769 3,414 10.1% 29,790 2,656 8.9% 
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Figure 3-4. Poverty Rate of the Population Age 65 and Older, 
by Race and Ethnicity, 1959 to 2001 (numbers in thousands) 
 
Black Hispanic Asian and Pacific Islander 
 Below Poverty Level  Below Poverty Level  Below Poverty Level  
Total Number Percent Total Number Percent Total Number Percent 
1959 (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1960 (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1961 (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1962 (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1963 (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1964 (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1965 (NA) 711 62.5% (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1966 1,311 722 55.1% (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1967 1,341 715 53.3% (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1968 1,374 655 47.7% (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1969 1,373 689 50.2% (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1970 1,422 683 48.0% (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1971 1,584 623 38.3% (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1972 1,603 640 39.9% (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1973 1,672 620 37.1% (NA) 95 24.9% (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1974 1,721 591 34.3% (NA) 117 28.9% (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1975 1,795 652 36.3% (NA) 137 32.6% (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1976 1,852 644 34.8% 464 128 27.7% (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1977 1,930 701 36.3% 518 113 21.9% (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1978 1,954 662 33.9% 539 125 23.2% (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1979 2,040 740 36.2% 574 154 26.8% (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1980 2,054 783 38.1% 582 179 30.8% (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1981 2,102 820 39.0% 568 146 25.7% (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1982 2,124 811 38.2% 596 159 26.6% (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1983 2,197 791 36.0% 782 173 22.1% (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1984 2,238 710 31.7% 819 176 21.5% (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1985 2,273 717 31.5% 915 219 23.9% (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1986 2,331 722 31.0% 906 204 22.5% (NA) (NA) (NA) 
1987 2,387 774 32.4% 885 243 27.5% 375 56 15.0% 
1988 2,436 785 32.2% 1,005 225 22.4% 442 60 13.5% 
1989 2,487 763 30.7% 1,024 211 20.6% 465 34 17.4% 
1990 2,547 860 33.8% 1,091 245 22.5% 514 62 12.1% 
1991 2,606 880 33.8% 1,143 237 20.8% 555 70 12.7% 
1992 2,504 838 33.5% 1,298 287 22.1% 494 53 10.8% 
1993 2,510 702 28.0% 1,390 297 21.4% 503 79 15.6% 
1994 2,557 700 27.4% 1,428 323 22.6% 513 67 13.0% 
1995 2,478 629 25.4% 1,458 342 23.5% 622 89 14.3% 
1996 2,616 661 25.3% 1,516 370 24.4% 647 63 9.7% 
1997 2,691 700 26.0% 1,617 384 23.8% 705 87 12.3% 
1998 2,723 718 26.4% 1,696 356 21.0% 785 97 12.4% 
1999 2,754 626 22.7% 1,752 358 20.4% 800 85 10.6% 
2000 2,785 607 21.8% 1,822 381 20.9% 878 82 9.3% 
2001 2,853 626 21.9% 1,896 413 21.8% 899 92 10.2% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Historical Poverty Tables from the Current Population Survey—People (Table 3). Available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty.html. 
  
106
Figure 3-6. Number of Active Participants 
in Defined Benefit and/or Defined Contribution 
Plans, 1979 to 1998 (numbers in thousands) 
 
 Defined Benefit Defined Contribution 
1979 29,440 17,489 
1980 30,133 18,893 
1981 30,082 20,743 
1982 29,756 23,448 
1983 29,964 27,844 
1984 30,172 30,603 
1985 29,024 33,244 
1986 28,670 34,620 
1987 28,432 34,959 
1988 28,081 34,062 
1989 27,304 33,990 
1990 26,344 35,488 
1991 25,747 35,771 
1992 25,362 38,868 
1993 25,127 39,619 
1994 24,615 40,357 
1995 23,531 42,662 
1996 23,262 44,625 
1997 22,745 47,979 
1998 22,994 50,335 
Source: Employee Benefits and Security Administration, 
U.S. Department of Labor. (2001–2002, Winter). Abstract of 1998 
Form 5500 Annual Reports. Pensions Plan Bulletin 11. Available at 
http://www.efast.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/1998pensionplanbulletin.PDF. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-9. Projected Number of Older Americans Using 
Supportive Services, 2000 to 2020 (numbers in millions) 
 
 Nursing Facility 
Alternative 
Residential Care
Skilled Home 
Care Personal Care 
2000 2.7 0.8 2.5 3.2 
2005 2.8 1.0 2.6 3.3 
2010 3.4 1.2 2.8 3.5 
2020 3.7 1.4 3.2 4.2 
Source: Commission on Affordable Housing and Health Facility Needs for Seniors in the 21st Century.  
(2002). A Quiet Crisis in America, A Report to Congress. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 
Available at http://www.seniorscommission.gov/pages/final_report/finalreport.pdf. 
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Figure 5-1. Average Annual Rate of Increase in Real GDP 
 
 
 
Decade Growth Rate 
1930s 2.0 
1940s 5.1 
1950s 3.5 
1960s 4.5 
1970s 3.5 
1980s 3.4 
1990s 3.2 
Source: Calculations based on Bureau of Economic Analysis. National Income Product 
Accounts Tables (Table 1.1.6). Available at http://www.bea.gov. 
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Figure 5-2. State and Local Government Expenditures as a 
Percentage of Total Government Expenditures, 1960 to 2003 
(numbers in billions of 2000 dollars) 
 
Source: Calculations based on Bureau of Economic Analysis. National Income Product Account Tables (Table 3.1 
and 3.6). Available at http://www.bea.gov. 
 Total Government Expenditures 
State and Local 
Government Expenditures 
Percentage State and 
Local Expenditures 
1960 $137.60  $50.50  36.7% 
1961 $149.50  $55.10  36.9% 
1962 $161.40  $58.70  36.4% 
1963 $169.00  $63.60  37.6% 
1964 $177.70  $69.40  39.1% 
1965 $188.90  $75.90  40.2% 
1966 $214.60  $84.80  39.5% 
1967 $242.70  $94.70  39.0% 
1968 $268.00  $106.80  39.9% 
1969 $286.40  $117.40  41.0% 
1970 $312.60  $132.30  42.3% 
1971 $340.10  $148.40  43.6% 
1972 $369.90  $162.30  43.9% 
1973 $399.70  $179.30  44.9% 
1974 $452.60  $202.60  44.8% 
1975 $533.10  $232.40  43.6% 
1976 $573.20  $250.60  43.7% 
1977 $619.90  $268.60  43.3% 
1978 $682.10  $295.50  43.3% 
1979 $759.60  $326.40  43.0% 
1980 $879.20  $363.40  41.3% 
1981 $996.40  $393.30  39.5% 
1982 $1,106.40  $421.00  38.1% 
1983 $1,206.10  $451.50  37.4% 
1984 $1,307.70  $491.40  37.6% 
1985 $1,434.10  $541.50  37.8% 
1986 $1,533.50  $589.30  38.4% 
1987 $1,617.20  $629.30  38.9% 
1988 $1,695.00  $673.50  39.7% 
1989 $1,815.50  $727.30  40.1% 
1990 $1,969.60  $800.50  40.6% 
1991 $2,069.10  $864.30  41.8% 
1992 $2,225.40  $915.30  41.1% 
1993 $2,292.40  $953.70  41.6% 
1994 $2,361.00  $1,003.20  42.5% 
1995 $2,464.90  $1,055.60  42.8% 
1996 $2,570.00  $1,100.10  42.8% 
1997 $2,645.00  $1,151.50  43.5% 
1998 $2,719.00  $1,209.10  44.5% 
1999 $2,825.70  $1,298.80  45.5% 
2000 $3,002.60  $1,393.50  46.4% 
2001 $3,175.40  $1,492.20  47.0% 
2002 $3,359.30  $1,563.20  46.5% 
2003 $3,563.00  $1,634.70  45.9% 
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